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Abstract
This comment explores a judgment in Texas against a Canadian defendant and corresponding
suit in Canada seeking to enforce the judgment. The ultimate determination was significant, rep-
resenting the first time that a Canadian appellate court addressed the impact of the Internet on a
Court’s adjudicatory decision. The comment explores the difficulty that the internet poses to the
doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
COMMENT
CANADA'S APPROACH TO JURISDICTION OVER
CYBERTORTS: BRAINTECH v KOSTIUK
Daniel P. Schafer*
It would create a crippling effect on freedom of expression if,
in every jurisdiction the world over in which access to In-
ternet could be achieved, a person who posts fair comment
on a bulletin board could be haled before the courts of each
of those countries where access to this bulletin could be ob-
tained.'
INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 1997, the District Court of Harris County, Texas,
entered a US$300,000 judgment in favor of BrainTech, Inc.'
The award compensated BrainTech for general and aggravated
damages,3 which resulted from allegedly defamatory remarks
posted on an Internet bulletin board.4 The judgment, however,
was rendered against a Canadian defendant with no assets in the
United States.5 Therefore, BrainTech brought suit in Canada,
and petitioned the court to recognize and enforce the judg-
ment.6 The ultimate determination was significant, representing
the first time that a Canadian appellate court addressed the im-
pact of the Internet on a court's adjudicatory jurisdiction.7 Also,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Fordham University School of Law. This Comment is
dedicated to my father, Michael Schafer, for being a constant source of inspiration.
1. BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 1999 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020, *32.
2. See id. at *3 (noting that district court entered default judgment against appel-
lant).
3. See id. at *18 (granting BrainTech US$250,000 in general damages and
US$50,000 in aggravated damages).
4. See id. at *10 (stating that there is no record of content of defamatory postings).
The court, however, assumed that a valid cause of action sounding in tort existed. Id.
5. See id. at *3 (indicating in statement of defense that John Kostiuk, defendant,
had no connection to forum state).
6. See id. at *2 (noting that BrainTech commenced proceedings in Supreme Court
of British Columbia to enforce judgment).
7. See Robert Wisener, Web Activities Not Immune from Liability, COMPUTING CANADA,
June 4, 1999 (noting that ruling by British Columbia Court of Appeals was first decision
to address issues created by Internet).
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the decision addressed the impact of the Internet on the Cana-
dian doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments, a doctrine recently altered due to increased interaction
among nations.8
In the last twenty years, interaction among distant econo-
mies and cultures has increased.' Modem communication tech-
nology has facilitated this interaction10 by instantly disseminating
published materials across the globe via satellite, television, and
most importantly, the Internet.1 Scholars note, however, that,
as individuals of different nations interact on a common ground,
international conflicts and litigation are bound to increase. 12
The international community has addressed problems13 cre-
8. See Morguard v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1097 (Can.) (stating that doc-
trine of recognition of foreign judgments was changed "in light of a new world order.").
9. See Antonio de Souza Menezes, Globalization and the World Economy, INDEPEND-
ENT, Nov. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21953301 (defining increased interaction as
globalization, which is process by which goods, services, people, and capital flow across
national boundaries, increasing interaction among nations).
10. See Emma Rothschild, Globalization and the Return of History, FoREIGN POLICY,
July 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 16580411 (noting that globalization is often associ-
ated with new technologies, such as Internet, cable news, international capital markets,
and high-speed travel).
11. See Rachel B. Korsower, Matusevich v. Telnikoff: The First Amendment Travels
Abroad, Preventing Recognition and Enforcement of a British Libel Judgment, 19 MD. J. INT' L.
& TRADE 225, 229 (1995) (noting how world is increasingly becoming single market for
media transmission while remaining fragmented market for legal services); see also
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (defining Internet as network of
computers). The court specifically stated:
The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer net-
works. It is thus a network or networks. This is best understood if one consid-
ers what a linked group of computers-referred to here as a "network"-is,
and what is does .... Some networks are "closed" networks, not linked to
other computers or networks. Many networks, however, are connected to
other networks, which are in turn connected to other networks in a manner
which permits each computer in any network to communicate with computers
on any other network in the system. This global Web of linked networks and
computers is referred to as the Internet.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-31.
12. See Symposium, The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1610, 1634
(1999) (stating that courts are going to encounter flood of litigation concerning In-
ternet contacts); Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MEte. U.L. Rv. 416, 417 (1999) (arguing that in-
creased interaction among individuals from different nations increases likelihood of
states becoming involved in adjudicatory and enforcement actions).
13. See, e.g., Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway: Foreign
Liability for Domestically Created Content, 14 CARwozo ARTS & Err. LJ. 523, 550 (1996)
(stating that problem created by satellite broadcasts is liability of transmitting entity to
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ated by traditional technological media 4 through treaties and
international cooperation.'" The problems created by the In-
ternet,'6 however, have not received a unified response. 7 In-
stead, individual nations have attempted to regulate the In-
ternet, applying domestic rules and principles.'" In the short-
term, individual governments have exercised some control over
the Internet by regulating conduct that directly affects its citi-
zens or occurs within its borders. 9 In the long-term, however, it
is unlikely that individual governments will be able to regulate
regulatory jurisdiction in all countries receiving broadcast signals). Also, satellite trans-
missions may violate copyright laws in every country in which the images are received.
Id.
14. See Ryan Yagura, Does Cyberspace Expand the Boundaries of Personal Jurisdiction, 38
IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 301, 310 (1998) (defining traditional technological media, in con-
text of defamation cases, as newspapers, magazines, telephone, fax, television, or radio
broadcast).
15. See, e.g., Gigante, supra note 13, at 550 (describing Council of Europe adopting
European Convention on Transfrontier Television). The European Convention on
Transfrontier Television grants jurisdiction over satellite transmissions to the country in
which the broadcasts originated. Id. This convention, however, did not address the
ability of a single transmission to violate copyright laws in various countries. Id. There-
fore, the European Union issued a directive applicable to transborder television broad-
casts that specifically addressed copyright issues and transborder satellite transmissions.
Id.
16. See, e.g., Michael Hatcher et. al., Computer Crime, 36 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 397, 398-
401 (1999) (noting that computer crime is major problem created by Internet). Schol-
ars have been unable to formulate a concise definition of computer crime, due to the
variety of actionable offenses that are committed with a computer. Id. at 398-99.
17. See Steve Gold, Storm Brews Between the US and EC over Internet Regulation, NEw-
syrEs, Apr. 1, 1998 (stating that European Union and United States differ over type of
regulation, if any, that is needed for development of Internet). The Commission for
the European Communities (or "Commission") wants to establish regulatory mecha-
nisms to ensure fair competition. Id. The United States, however, is hesitant, fearing
that any regulatory mechanisms would create a nanny state over the Internet. Id. But
see Steve Gold, World Cybercrime Treaty May Be Under Way, NEwsBvrEs, Jan. 14, 2000 (cit-
ing unconfirmed reports that numerous countries, including, Canada, European
Union, Japan, United States, and others, are working on Cybercrime treaty). The draft
is rumored to cover topics such as Internet hacking and eavesdropping. Gold, supra. If
true, then this draft would be the first time legislators have addressed the issue of In-
ternet security since the inception of the Internet. Id.
18. See Ogilvy Renault, Jurisdiction and the Internet, Are Traditional Rules Enough?,
Uniform Law Conference of Canada,July 1998 (visited Apr. 11, 2000) <http://www.law.
ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/ejurisd.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (commenting that practical effect of Internet disputes is important because
courts traditionally apply domestic rules of forum).
19. See Symposium, Cyberspace Regulation and the Discourse of State Sovereignty, 112
HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1691-93 (1999) (noting that governments are determined to regu-
late cyberspace); RobertJ. Anello, New Technology Spawns New Crimes and Privacy Issues,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1999, at S13 (noting that Federal Trade Commission has brought 97
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computer-mediated communications completely based on terri-
torial notions effectively. 20
Scholars note that the decentralized nature of the Internet
confounds national legislation2 1 by rendering laws based on ter-
ritorial control inconvenient and irrelevant.2 2 The very notion
of territoriality may even be outdated in a world demarcated not
by nations and states, but by computer networks.23 Individual
nations, however, continue to decide cases, applying laws de-
fined by notions of territorial sovereignty to extraterritorial and
international transmissions. 4
These judgments are often unenforceable because individ-
ual nations are not obligated to recognize foreign judgments. 25
Internet fraud enforcement actions in last five years). These cases involve pyramid
schemes, false advertising, and investment fraud. Anello, supra.
20. See Renault, supra note 18 (stating that characteristics of Internet make it resis-
tant to traditional rules and principles).
21. See id. (stating that ability of Internet to circumvent national legislation is most
apparent in disputes over forum). Internet communications are not confined within
geographical boundaries, but instead broadcast throughout the world through digital
networks. Id.; see also Jo-Ann M. Adams, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403, 405
(1996) (arguing that structure of Internet prohibits government regulation, allowing
crimes on Internet to occur).
22. See Gigante, supra note 13, at 548 (stating that Internet is beyond all govern-
ment regulation because individual nations can impose only partial regulatory frame-
work on Internet); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, New Civic Virtue on the Internet,
(visited Apr. 11, 2000) <www.cli.org/paper4.html> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (questioning whether laws organized by territorial boundaries can
be effective in environment that separates effects of action from location in which ac-
tion occurs); Joel Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, in BOR-
DERS IN CYBERSPACE 84, 85-87 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., MIT Press 1996)
(describing destruction of territorial borders by Internet); Juliet M. Oberding & Terje
Norderhaug, A Separate Jurisdiction for Cyberspace (visited Apr. 11, 2000) <http://
www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issuel/uris.html> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (discussing whether traditional notion ofjurisdiction should be altered in
light of global nature of Internet).
23. See Matthew I- Burnstein, Conflict on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 81 (1996) (stating that Internet communica-
tions can circumvent laws based upon national borders and territorial jurisdiction).
24. See Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1996, at DI (noting that China regulates Internet by controlling access through cen-
trally regulated servers); see also David L. Marcus, Nations Strive To Limit Freedom of the
Internet, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 1998, at Al (reporting that at least 20 states limit
Internet access); Gigante, supra note 13, at 548 (commenting that national legislation
of Internet communications will create Tower of Babel with each nation applying law
based on territorial boundaries to extraterritorial transmissions).
25. See Whincop, supra note 12, at 419 (stating that nations must submit to com-
mitments on their own accord); Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our-Need for a
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Absent international obligation, some countries do recognize
and enforce foreign judgments based on their own national stan-
dards. 26  Often these doctrines require that the original court
properly exercised jurisdiction. 27 Scholars note, however, that
this requirement presents a problem for courts debating
whether to recognize and enforce international Cybertorts28 and
Cybercrimes. 29
Since Cybertorts transcend traditional jurisdictional analy-
sis, courts may have difficulty determining when to enforce a for-
eign Cybertort judgment. 30 Commentators have stated that this
Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away To Get It?, 24 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 167 (1998) (noting that no international accord requires United States to
recognize and enforce foreign judgments).
26. See, e.g., Symposium, A Canadian Perspective, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31, 42-51
(1998) (noting that Canadian doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments is not based upon existence of treaty). Until the 1990s, Canada had become a
signatory to only one treaty on enforcement of foreign judgments. Id. at 42. Some
Canadian provinces, however, have designated individual countries as reciprocating ju-
risdictions, essentially facilitating enforcement of judgments through a registration
mechanism. Id.; see also Felix D. Strebel, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Foreign
Public Law, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L COM. LJ. 55, 64 (1999) (noting that Switzerland will
enforce foreign judgment that meet certain procedural requirements).
27. See Strebel, supra note 26, at 63 (stating that most important requirement is
proper exercise of jurisdiction by court that originally passed judgment).
28. See Rosalind Resnick, Cybertort: The New Era, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at Al
(defining Cybertort as cause of action that exists due to harmful Internet contact). Ros-
alind Resnick notes that some Cybertorts are so revolutionary that legislative and judi-
cial guidance is non-existent. Id. Other disputes, however, are simply high-tech ver-
sions of existing causes of action. Id.
29. See Gabriole Zeviar-Geese, The State of the Law on Cybejurisdiction and Cybercrime
on the Internet, (visited Apr. 11, 2000) <http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/borders/docu-
ments/cyberlaw.htm> (on file with Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that
Cybercrimes include credit card fraud, unauthorized access to computer systems, child
pornography, software piracy, and cyberstalking). The definition for Cybercrimes, how-
ever, is constantly evolving under U.S. federal and state law. Id. The definitional classi-
fication of new crimes and torts is not the only difficulty commentators posed by
Cybertorts and Cybercrimes. Id. They also create a problem for courts when analyzing
jurisdiction, because the Internet is ajurisdictional. Id.; Tomas A. Lipinski, The Develop-
ing Legal Infrastructure and the Globalization of Information: Constructing a Framework for
Critical Choices in the New Millennium Internet-Character, Content and Confusion, 6 RcH.
J.L. & TECH. 19, (1999) (last visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/
v6i4/article2.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal (commenting
that legal problems arise due to conflicting viewpoints over characterization of In-
ternet); Renault, supra note 18 (stating that traditional rules relating to jurisdiction are
based on territorial boundaries, allowing countries to govern solely within geographical
borders).
30. See Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the
Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 342 (1996) (noting that courts
struggle with Cybertorts due to failure to comprehend Internet and jurisdiction).
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determination is important, because the Internet has offline ef-
fects.3 Allowing individuals to hide behind the anonymity of
the Internet 2 may lead to inequitable results. 33 One commenta-
tor has urged that the international community avoid this result,
advocating that different nations establish cooperative mecha-
nisms to recognize and enforce judgments based on accepted
notions of jurisdiction. 34
This Comment explores the difficulty that the Internet
poses to the doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. Part I provides an overview of U.S. jurisdiction analy-
sis and the Canadian doctrine of recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. Part I also provides a brief overview of the
31. See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1163, 1200
(1999) (stating that Internet causes harm to individuals, thereby creating normative
case for jurisdiction); Cyberspace Regulation, supra note 19, at 1687 (commenting that
Internet overrides community values and standards, subjecting communities to
whatever information may be online).
32. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 22 (noting that law enforcement on-line is prob-
lematic because finding anonymous or pseudo-anonymous user within any specific ju-
risdiction is very difficult).
33. See Pierre Trudel, Jurisdiction over the Internet: A Canadian Perspective, 32 IT'L
LAw. 1027, 1028 (1998) (noting that increased interaction has made it difficult for
courts to establish jurisdiction); Tamir Maltz, Customary Law & Power in Internet Commu-
nities, (visited Apr. 11, 2000) <www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issuel/custom.html> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (commenting that Internet is exit strategy
from government regulation, because offender can shift geographic location when cer-
tain activities violate laws of territorial government); Whincop, supra note 12, at 417
(stating issue of enforcement is important due to increased interaction among nation
states). As interaction increases, the likelihood of conflict of laws will increase expo-
nentially. Whincop, supra. This increase will, in turn, necessitate cooperation among
individual nations. Id.
34. See Trudel, supra note 33, at 1028 (advocating that individual countries must
rework their legislative policies while, internationally, countries must establish coopera-
tive mechanisms). This approach is novel because the international community has
already developed cooperative mechanisms to ensure that crimes are punished, regard-
less of the territorial location of the offenders. Id. at 1033; see also Dagesse v. Plant
Hotel N.V., No. 98-713-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *25 (D.C.N.H. Jan. 5, 2000)
(stating that "[t ] he [U.S.] Supreme Court has long recognized that personal jurisdic-
tion must adjust to changing technological and commercial innovation."); Hanson v.
Deckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (acknowledging that "as technological progress has
increased the flow of commerce between the States, the need for jurisdiction has under-
gone a similar increase"); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (acknowl-
edging that "it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial
amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state
lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted."); Renault, supra note 18 (stating that expansion of court's jurisdiction,
which was originally spurred by internal trade and communication, has been necessi-
tated by Internet).
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Internet, including its creation, structure, and features. Finally,
Part I discusses how the United States has dealt with jurisdiction
requirements in cases involving the Internet, specifically address-
ing defamatory postings on the Internet. Part II discusses the
BrainTech v. Kostiuk case, which is the first Canadian appellate
court decision to discuss the enforcement of a foreign, Cybertort
judgment. Part III argues that the British Columbia (or "B.C.")
Court of Appeals mechanical application of the Canadian doc-
trine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments ex-
emplifies a protectionist ruling, which the Supreme Court of
Canada recently indicated was impermissible. Also, the British
Columbia Court of Appeals improperly applied existing U.S.
case law to determine whether a real and substantial connection
exists between the cause of action and the forum state.
I. JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: PROBLEMS CREATED BY CYBERTORTS
Ultimately, the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate an ac-
tion depends on whether it can bind the parties to its judg-
ment. 5 Generally, geographical boundaries define a court's ju-
risdiction.36 Either an individual must reside or the injury un-
derlying a cause of action must occur in the adjudicating
country.3 7 Territorial boundaries are pivotal in judicial enforce-
ment,3" allowing a country jurisdiction over its citizens and inter-
35. See Trudel, supra note 33, at 1035-39 (discussing principle of territoriality of
laws). The principle of territoriality of laws provides that countries can adjudicate and
regulate actions that take place within the country's geographic boundaries. Id. at
1035. As a derivative of sovereignty, the principle of territoriality is recognized univer-
sally. Id. at 1035-36. This principle has two branches: subjective and objective territori-
ality. Id. at 1036. Objective territoriality recognizes jurisdiction over actions that cause
harm within the territories of a state, but do not actually occur there. Id. at 1036-37.
On the other hand, subjective territoriality recognizes jurisdiction over actions that oc-
curred completely within the territories of a state. Id. at 1036.
36. See Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, 4
MICH. TELECOMMUNICATION L. REv. 69 (1998) (noting that principle of subjective terri-
toriality allows country to regulate actions within territorial boundaries).
37. See Business Law Committee on Law of Commerce in Cyberspace, American
Bar Association, Prospectus, Transnational Issues in Cyberspace: A Project on the Law Relating
to Jurisdiction, (visited on Apr. 11, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/initia-
tives/prospect.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter
ABA Prospectus] (outlining jurisdiction of court to adjudicate action and noting that
link must exist between adjudicating forum and defendant).
38. See Cyberspace Regulation, supra note 19, at 1682 (stating that discussions on In-
ternet regulations yield three interpretations of state sovereignty: realist, representa-
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nal affairs. s° Many states, however, also assume jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants.40
In such an action, a successful litigant may have to enforce
the judgment in a foreign court.4 1 The foreign court may recog-
nize the judgment, but only after scrutinizing the original
court's jurisdiction analysis.4 2 Such an analysis, however, is diffi-
cult when examining a foreign Cybertort judgment, since
Cybertorts can transcend territorial boundaries.43
A. U.S. Jurisdiction and Canadian Enforcement of U.S. Judgments
In the United States, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment44 limits the ability of a state court to render
tional, and postmodern). According to the representational conception, the ability of a
nation to regulate activity depends on whether such regulation would prevent a state
from representing the populace. Id. at 1686-87. The postmodern conception states
that in an era of increased globalization, overlapping and segmented authority is devel-
oping. Id. at 1688-90. Most discourse on Internet regulation, however, relies on the
realist conception. Id. at 1684. This conception asserts that an individual country pos-
sesses sole power to regulate its citizens and internal affairs. Id. at 1683.
39. See id. at 1683 (discussing examples of states relying on realist conception to
regulate online activities).
40. See, e.g., CODE CWL [C. Civ.], art. 3148 (Can.) (defining situations in which
court can hear personal actions of patrimonial nature). A Quebec court has jurisdic-
tion when:
(1) the defendant has his domicile or his residence in Quebec;
(2) the defendant is a legal person, is not domiciled in Quebec but has an
establishment in Quebec, and the dispute relates to its activities in Que-
bec;
(3) a fault was committed in Quebec, damage was suffered in Quebec, an
injurious act occurred in Quebec or one of the obligations rising from a
contract was to be performed in Quebec;
(4) the parties have by agreement submitted to it all existing or future dis-
putes between themselves arising out of a specified legal relationship;
(5) the defendant submits to its jurisdiction.
Id.
41. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States:
In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 253, 255
(1991) (declaring that U.S. litigants must not only consider ability to obtain favorable
judgment, but also ability to enforce judgment in foreign court).
42. See A.V. DicEy &J.H.C. MoRmis, THE CONFLIUCr OF LAws, Rule 41 (L. Collins et
al. eds., 1993) (discussing process by which courts recognize foreign judgments).
43. See Zembek, supra note 30, at 342 (commenting that courts fail to understand
problems created by Internet and jurisdictional requirements).
44. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (stating, in part, that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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a valid judgment against a non-resident defendant.4 5 If a judg-
ment against a non-resident defendant is obtained, however,
then the award is enforceable only if a foreign court recognizes
the judgment.4 6 In Canada, a court will enforce a judgment
from a foreign country, provided a real and substantial connec-
tion exists between the original court and the cause of action."
1. In Personam Jurisdiction
Historically, in personam jurisdiction grants a court power
over a defendant.4' Therefore, the defendant's physical pres-
ence within the forum state is a prerequisite to a court exercising
jurisdiction.49 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, allows courts to adjudicate claims over
nonresident defendants if certain procedural and substantive re-
quirements are met."°
a. Due Process
The Due Process Clause places two limitations on the exten-
sion of jurisdiction: courts may exercise jurisdiction only if the
defendant has sufficient contacts5 with the forum state and in-
45. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (stating that "the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the juris-
diction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident
defendants.").
46. See Jerome A. Hoffman, Recognition by Courts in the Eleventh Circuit ofJudgments
Rendered by Courts of Other Countries, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 65, 69 (1999) (commenting that
original court's judgment is recognized and enforced according to recognizing sover-
eign's standards).
47. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (Can.) (extending application of real and substantial test
from recognition ofjudgments rendered in sister-provinces to judgments rendered in
foreign jurisdictions).
48. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment
Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (commenting thatjurisdiction
of court to render judgment in personam is power over defendant's person).
49. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (stating that in order to deter-
mine liability of defendant, "he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of
process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.").
50. See id. at 714 (holding that Due Process clause limits states' ability to exercise
jurisdiction over non-resident defendant).
51. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (holding that minimum con-
tacts analysis should focus on "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation."); Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (commenting that "it is essen-
tial in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting business within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
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justice will not result.52 The first limitation of the Due Process
analysis may be satisfied if the court exercises general53 or spe-
cific jurisdiction54 over an individual.
In order to determine whether injustice will result, courts
often weigh numerous factors. 55 The factors are not applied uni-
fits and protections of its laws."); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980) (analyzing relationship between defendant and forum to determine
whether "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
52. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (stating that "due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice." (internal citations omitted)).
53. See Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1121 (3d
Cir. 1992) (stating that "[i]f a party is subject to the general jurisdiction of a state, that
party can be called to answer any claim against her, regardless of whether the subject
matter of the cause of action has any connection to the forum."). Therefore, general
jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate a claim, even if the cause of action does not
have a connection to the forum. Id.; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding that defendant must establish systematic and contin-
uous contacts with forum state for general jurisdiction to exist). In Helicopteros, the
Court held that a business trip to the forum state, purchase of equipment from a resi-
dent within the forum state, and acceptance of a check drawn from a state bank within
the forum did not constitute systematic and continuous activities. Helicopteros, supra; see
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (holding that activities must be "so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings en-
tirely distinct from those activities.").
54. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that
individuals must have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."). Therefore, specific jurisdiction arises when a de-
fendant knows that a particular activity may compel a court to exercise jurisdiction. Id.;
see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (noting that court
will impute knowledge when defendant's actions were intentionally directed at resident
of forum state); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (holding that litigation arises out of or
relates to the defendant's actions).
55. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 4776 (1985) (listing factors that
court applies to determine whether injustice results from court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion). The factors include "the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering funda-
mental substantive social policies." Id.; see also Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB.,
11 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing application of factors to case) The
factors are:
(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum
state's affairs;
(2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum;
(3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state;
(4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
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formly, creating tension in their application.5 6 Courts have indi-
cated, however, that a plaintiff must meet a higher jurisdictional
threshold when a non-resident defendant is a foreign citizen, as
opposed to a U.S. citizen.57
b. Long-Arm Statutes
If the constitutional requirements of the due process clause
are satisfied, then a court must determine whether a state's long-
arm statute permits the exercise ofjurisdiction.5 8 Most state leg-
islatures have broad statutes, allowing the jurisdiction of state
courts to extend as far as due process allows. 59 Therefore, per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis often will be decided by the due pro-
cess analysis.6 °
2. U.S.-Canadian Cooperative Mechanisms for Enforcement
and Recognition of Foreign Judgments
In lieu of extending territorial jurisdiction, countries have
developed mechanisms to deal with the limited reach of their
(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and
effective relief; and
(7) the existence of an alternative forum.
Core-Vent Corp., F.3d at 1487-88.
56. Id. at 1488.
57. See FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co. Ltd., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1987)
(noting that burden of defending suit in foreign jurisdiction weighs against exercising
jurisdiction); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984) (com-
menting that court's finding of jurisdiction over non-resident defendant presents po-
tential affront to sovereignty of defendant's state).
58. See Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (placing restriction on long-arm
statutes by requiring that defendant purposefully avail himself of benefits and protec-
tions of laws of forum state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (affirming constitu-
tionality of Massachusetts statute that granted jurisdiction over non-resident defendant
motorists involved in altercation in Massachusetts); see, e.g., N803RA, Inc. v. Hammer,
11 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that Texas courts may exercise
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants if state long-arm statue authorizes jurisdiction
and exercise of jurisdiction complies with federal constitutional guarantees).
59. See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (stating that broad
language of Texas long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to limits of due process clause).
But see John A. Lowther IV, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet Quagmire: Amputating
Judicially Created Long-Arms, 35 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 619, 621 (1998) (commenting that
long-arm statutes differ, which is simply nature of jurisdictional law).
60. See E. Gabriel Perle, et al., Electronic Publishing And Software, Part II, 17 COM-
PUTER LAw. Jan. 15, 2000 (noting that jurisdictional analysis of most courts only exam-
ines due process requirements since most state statutes exercise jurisdiction to extent of
constitution).
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laws.6 Mutual legal assistance,62 cooperation,63 supranational
adjudication," and harmonization 65 are mechanisms that ex-
tend the reach of a country's jurisdiction while promoting re-
spect for the sovereignty of another nation.66 Also, countries
can cooperate by recognizing and enforcing judgments ren-
dered in a foreign jurisdiction.67
61. See Trudel, supra note 33, at 1030 (commenting that jurisdiction of court to
adjudicate depends on ability legally to bind parties). Since a court cannot bind parties
beyond the geographical borders of the forum state, cooperative mechanisms were de-
veloped to effectuate the decisions of tribunals. Id.
62. See id. at 1050 (defining mutual legal assistance in criminal matters as process
by which domestic nation permits foreign nation to engage in criminal procedures that
are within jurisdiction of domestic nation). Mutual legal assistance developed because
international law prohibits nations to exercise executive jurisdiction in another nation.
Id. at 1047. Therefore, mutual legal assistance developed to prevent repression of a
crime with international elements. Id. In a criminal context, mutual legal assistance
allows a foreign state to execute search warrants, gather evidence, and transfer individu-
als in custody. Id. at 1050-51.
63. See Delvin J. Losing, Comity in the Free Trade Zone, 74 N.D. L. REV. 737, 762
(1998) (discussing use of foreign judgment agreements). Foreign judgment agree-
ments are the most effective method to achieve fairness and consistency in the interna-
tional legal system. Id. First, signatories could determine the scope of any agreement,
thereby establishing consistency between two countries. Id. Next, enforcement of the
standards would be consistent, ensuring that judgments could be enforced fairly. Id.
Finally, an agreement would provide transparency to the legal system, allowing individ-
uals and corporation to modify their behavior accordingly. Id.
64. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1997) (stating that European Court
of Justice and European Court of Human Rights played major role in convincing na-
tional governments to participate in high-stakes, supranational adjudication); see also
Gigante, supra note 13, at 548 (discussing proposal by French government to adopt
international law of Internet). The proposal was made in response to the ability of the
Internet to circumvent existing legal regimes. Gigante, supra.
65. See Lipinski, supra note 29 (defining harmonization as process by which na-
tions conform their laws to international standards).
66. See Trudel, supra note 33, at 1030 (stating that cooperative mechanisms facili-
tate respect for foreign standards).
67. See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 65 (describing process by which court recog-
nizes and enforces foreign judgments); A Canadian Perspective, supra note 26, at 34 (dis-
cussing interest of Canada joining multilateral convention on enforcement of foreign
judgments). In the 1990s, the recognition of foreign judgments in Canada began to be
perceived as too liberal. A Canadian Perspective, supra, at 34-35. Canadians feared this
liberalization would diminish the likelihood of reciprocal treatment. Id. at 35. Also,
commentators feared that North American Free Trade Agreement would increase in-
ternational conflicts, subjecting Canadian nationals to foreign litigation. Id. But see
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Symposium, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 ViLL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1996)
(stating that international legal framework does not facilitate enforcement of foreign
judgments). Although judgments may be enforced, the lack of coherence in the inter-
national legal framework does not promote confidence in a party that a judgment will
actually be enforced. Id.
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a. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
A country recognizes a foreign judgment by certifying,
through a judicial hearing that a judgment rendered in another
country shall be treated as its own.' This action, if successful,
forecloses the possibility of re-adjudicating claims, defenses, or
other issues already resolved by the tribunals originally exercis-
ing jurisdiction. 6' Thereafter, the recognizing court can author-
ize the appropriate agencies or agents to enforce the judg-
ment,70 empowering agents to seize the debtor's assets or take
other actions.71
b. U.S.-Canadian Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments
At least until the early 1990s, Canadian courts based the rec-
ognition of foreign judgments upon British common law72 and
pre-Revolutionary French civil law rules. 73  Recently, however,
the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the doctrine of recog-
68. See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 66-75 (discussing difference between recogni-
tion of foreign judgments and enforcement of foreign judgments). The doctrine of
reocognition and enforcement of foreign judgments resembles a judicial function and
consists of two parts. Id. at 67. First, the judgment must be recognized, a process by
which the appropriate tribunal certifies that the judgment is a valid, enforceable deci-
sion. Id. at 69. Next, the tribunal enforces the judgment, a process by which proce-
dures for enforcing the judgment are prescribed and implemented. Id. at 70. This
distinction, which is fine, is not always made when legal scholars disc.uss the doctrine of
enforcement. Id.
69. See Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Rule and Reason in the Common Law of Foreign
Judgments, 12 CAN. J.L. &Juius. 193, 194 (1999) (noting that court does not function as
appellate court). Therefore, a court will not review the substance of a decision, even if
the foreign court made a mistake as to fact or law. Id.
70. See Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1321 n.8 (2d Cir. 1973)
(stating that determination of enforcement of foreign judgment and recognition of
foreign judgment are separate); Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo, 65 B.R. 466, 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that recognition of foreign judgment does not necessitate en-
forcement).
71. See Strebel, supra note 26, at 61-63 (describing terms commonly used in en-
forcement of foreign judgments). Enforcement is the actual seizure, sale, and distribu-
tion of funds. Id. at 61; see also John Spears, Lloyd's Names Ordered To Pay Losses, To-
RONTO STAR, Mar. 9, 2000, at BU &1 (describing collection of assets in Canada on judg-
ment originally entered in England).
72. SeeA Canadian Perspective, supra note 26, at 38 (noting that British common law
rules were traditional and conservative); Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S. Judgments in
Canada: "Things Are Looking Up!," 15 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 491, 491-93 (1995) (stating
that under U.K. common law rules, Canada maintains strict recognition policy).
73. See A Canadian Perspective, supra note 26, at 38 (noting that French civil law
rules were solely followed in Quebec); Weintraub, supra note 25, at 178 (stating that
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nition and enforcement of foreign judgments must adjust to
technological and societal advancements."4 Therefore, Cana-
dian courts will defer to comity and recognize a foreign judg-
ment if a real and substantial connection exists between the fo-
rum state and the cause of action.75
i. Real and Substantial Connection
In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De. Savoye,7 6 the Supreme
Court of Canada took the first step towards reformulating the
basis for recognizing foreign judgments. 77 Although the deci-
sion did not explicitly involve foreign judgments, the court held
that courts should give full faith and credit to decisions rendered
in other provinces. 7' Recognition, however, was limited to cases
where the original court properly exercised jurisdiction. 79 The
Morguard court further refined this point, stating that a judg-
ment should only be recognized if a real and substantial connec-
tion existed between the original court and the cause of action. 0
judgments from other provinces were only recognized if original exercise ofjurisdiction
was consistent with enforcing provinces jurisdictional requirements).
74. See Morguard v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1097 (Can.) (stating that Ca-
nadian doctrine "must be adjusted in light of a changing world order.").
75. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (Can.) (stating that real and substantial test formulated in
Morguard applies to issuance of anti-suit injunction).
76. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
77. See, e.g., Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd., [1993] 83 B.C.L.R.2d 177 (Can.)
(extending application of Morguard to international cases). Judge George S. Cum-
mings, of the British Columbia Court of Appeals, stated: "The case at bar arises out of
international commerce-the sale of a boat to Moses in Alaska. So the informing prin-
ciple of private international law (comity) supports the extension of the real and sub-
stantial test to the circumstances here." Id. at 187.
78. See Morguard, 3 S.C.1R at 1102 (analyzing constitutional rules of various coun-
tries before extending principle in U.S. Constitution of full faith and credit to judg-
ments rendered in sister-provinces). Justice Gerard V. La Forest stated: "[T]he courts
in one province should give full faith and credit, to use the language of the United
States Constitution, to the judgments given by a court in another province or territory,
so long as the court has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action."
Id.
79. See id. at 1103 (noting that "the taking of jurisdiction by a court in one prov-
ince and its recognition in other provinces must be viewed as correlatives, and ...
recognition... should be dependent on the fact that the court giving judgment 'prop-
erly' or 'appropriately' exercised jurisdiction.").
80. See A Canadian Perspective, supra note 26, at 39 (discussing formulation of
Morguard test). The Morguard test provides that a court should only recognize a judg-
ment rendered in another province if a real and substantial connection existed be-
tween the original court and the cause of action. Id.; see also Hunt v. T & N plc [ 1993] 4
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ii. Comity
Three years later, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia
(Workers' Compensation Board),8" the Supreme Court of Canada
expounded on the principles discussed in Morguard, while ad-
dressing the basis for an anti-suit injunction.8 2 The court recog-
nized that comity8 3 was an issue, since the issuance of an anti-suit
injunction infringes on the sovereignty of a foreign court.84
Generally, comity is the respect due to the acts taken by another
country.85 The notion of comity, however, is not only based on
the principle of respect, but also on convenience and necessity.86
The definition of comity adopted by the Amchem court im-
plied two competing interests, international duty and territorial
sovereignty. 7 Neither interest is paramount.88 Instead, the doc-
S.C.R. 289 (Can.) (upholding real and substantial test and holding that test was
grounded in constitutional values).
81. Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) [1993] 1
S.C.R. 897 (Can.).
82. See id. at 912-13 (noting that anti-suit injunction is aggressive remedy whereby
individual petitions domestic court to restrain foreign litigant from "launching or con-
tinuing a proceeding in the courts of another jurisdiction.").
83. See id. at 913-14 (adopting definition of comity set forth by U.S. Supreme Court
in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)). The Court stated that:
'Comity' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens of other pegons who are
under the protection of its laws.
Id. (emphasis added)
84. See Amchem, I S.C.R. at 913 (discussing anti-suit injunctions and comity). Anti-
suit injunctions infringe on the sovereignty of a foreign court, because the injunction
enjoins litigation in another country, in effect, resolving the litigation for the foreign
court. Id.
85. See Morguard v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1095 (Can.) (stating that com-
ity is "deference and respect due by other states to the action of a state legitimately
taken within its territory.").
86. See id. at 1096 (stating that in modem times, common ground is needed to
facilitate flow of goods and services between nations). The court then quotes at length
from Arthur T. von Meheren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, 1603 (1968), which states, in
part, that "[t ] he ultimate justification for according some degree of recognition is that
if in our highly complex and interrelated world each community exhausted every possi-
bility of insisting on its parochial interests, injustice would result and the normal patters
of life would be disrupted." Id.
87. See Amchem, 1 S.C.R. at 913-14 (recognizing country's international duty and
duty to citizens in definition of comity).
88. See id. (noting that lack of universal acceptance of comity necessitates issuance
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trine of forum non conveniens"9 acts as a counterweight, balancing
the interests. 0 Therefore, a Canadian court will infringe on the
sovereignty of a foreign court or contradict a foreign court order
only when the foreign court has departed from the Canadian
doctrine of forum non conveniens.91
iii. Forum Non Conveniens
Although all Canadian jurisdictions recognize the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, governing legislation92 and common law
statutes9" in this area are succinct.9 4 One commentator notes
of anti-suit injunctions in certain cases, but only when original court departed from
Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens).
89. See Ellen B. Hayes, Forum Non Conveniens in England, Australia and Japan: The
Allocation of Jurisdiction in Transnational Litigation, 26 U.B.C. LAW REv. 41 (1992) (dis-
cussing application of doctrine of forum non conveniens). In accordance with doctrine of
forum non conveniens, a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if
the forum is not the appropriate venue for the action. Id. Also, a court should decline
to exercise jurisdiction if considerations of justice require the plaintiff to litigate in
another jurisdiction. Id.
90. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation.
Board) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 915 (Can.) (noting that doctrine of forum non conveniens
provides specific criteria to determine whether to defer to comity).
91. See id. at 934 (discussing situations when Canadian court will grant anti-suit
injunction). The court stated:
[W]hen a foreign court assumes jurisdiction on a basis that generally con-
forms to our rule of private international law relating to the [doctrine of]
forum non conveniens, that decision will be respected and a Canadian court will
not purport, to make the decision for the foreign court. The policy of our
courts with respect to comity demands no less. If, however, a foreign court
assumes jurisdiction on a basis that is inconsistent with our rules of private
international law and an injustice results to a litigant or "would-be" litigant in
our courts, then the assumption of jurisdiction is inequitable and the party
invoking foreign jurisdiction can be restrained. The foreign court, not having,
itself, observed the rules of comity, cannot expect its decision to be respected
on the basis of comity.
Id.
92. See CODE CrviL [C. Crv.], art. 3135 (Can.) (stating that court may decline juris-
diction "if it considered that the authorities of another country are in a better position
to decide.").
93. See CODE CiviL PROC. [C. Crv. PROC.], rule 17.06(2) (Can.) (stating that court
may stay proceeding or set aside service of non-resident defendant if it is satisfied that
Ontario is not convenient forum for hearing).
94. See Renault, supra note 18 (discussing doctrine of forum non conveniens in Can-
ada). A Canadian court may stay or dismiss a suit if it finds that another jurisdiction has
a closer connection to the events giving rise to the litigation or that another jurisdiction
is better situated to adjudicate the issues. Id. Therefore, the court considers evidence
indicating that a more appropriate forum exists. Id. Such evidence includes the loca-
tion of parties, witnesses, and evidence. Id.
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that such legislative restraint has produced a fluid doctrine that
can easily adapt to specific disputes.95 Even though the Supreme
Court of Canada clarified the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
Amchem,96 provincial courts still reject well-founded forum non
conveniens applications.97
In Amchem, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that, in
conformity with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court
must determine whether there is another forum that is clearly
more appropriate than the domestic forum. 98 The court must
consider factors such as applicable law, the location of key par-
ties, and activities giving rise to the litigation. 99 Also, the court
must recognize as a matter of comity that a foreign court has
already assumed jurisdiction."' 0
95. See id. (stating that Canadian courts have declinedforum non conveniens applica-
tions notwithstanding occurrence of negligent acts and damages within alternate fo-
rum).
96. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 921 (Can.) (holding that "the existence of a more appro-
priate forum must be clearly established to displace the forum selected."); Antares Ship-
ping Corp. v. The Ship "Capricorn" [1976] 65 D.L.R. (3d) 105, 123 (Can.) (discussing
application of forum non conveniens in admiralty action). The court stated that the pri-
mary consideration in determining whether to exercise its discretion to issue an order
out was "the existence of some other forum more convenient and appropriate for the
pursuit of the action and for securing the ends of justice." Antares Shipping, [1976] 65
D.L.R. at 123.
97. See Renault, supra note 18 (noting that Canadian courts have declined forum
non conveniens applications despite occurrence of alleged negligence in differentjuis-
diction).
98. See Amchem, [19931 1 S.C.R. at 58 (discussing issuance of anti-suit injunctions).
The court stated that "the domestic court must proceed to entertain the application for
an injunction but only if it is alleged to be the most appropriate forum and is poten-
tially an appropriate forum . . . ." Id.
99. See Renault, supra note 18 (stating that court must consider connection be-
tween forums competing for jurisdiction and cause of action).
100. SeeAmchem, [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 59 (stating that recognition of foreign proceed-
ing is element of forum non conveniens). The court further noted:
In this step of the analysis, the domestic court as a matter of comity must take
cognizance of the fact that the foreign court has assumed jurisdiction. If, ap-
plying the principles relating to forum non conveniens outlined above, the for-
eign court could reasonably have concluded that there was no alternative fo-
rum that was clearly more appropriate, the domestic court should respect that
decision and the application should be dismissed. When there is a genuine
disagreement between the courts of our country and another, the courts of
this country should not arrogate to themselves the decision for both jurisdic-
tions. In most cases it will appear from the decision of the foreign court
whether it acted on principles similar to those that obtain here, but, if not,
then the domestic court must consider whether the result is consistent with
those principles.
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B. Internet, Its Applications, and Cybercrimes
The Internet is an expansive computer network that oper-
ates by connecting computers from around the world to each
other.10 1 Such an organizational structure provides a powerful
means to interact with other individuals in remote corners of the
world.1"2 Increased human interaction, however, has led to liti-
gation.1 03
1. Background
The Internet began in the 1960s as a U.S. Department of
Defense (or "DOD") project in response to the Cold War.10 4
The DOD commissioned engineers to connect the agency's com-
puters, creating the Advanced Research Project Agency Network
("ARPANET"). °5 Recognizing the utility of computer networks
in civilian applications, the U.S. government encouraged scien-
tific and academic communities to develop their own computer
networks to further their research. 10 6 Thereafter, commercial
entities realized the potential of the Internet and quickly at-
tempted to make the Internet accessible to the general public.0 7
Id.
101. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (defining Internet as "interna-
tional network of interconnected computers.").
102. See Lowther, supra note 59, at 622 (commenting how company can be accessi-
ble worldwide through use of Internet with minimal investment of time and money).
103. See Losing, supra note 63, at 737 (noting that international litigation is com-
monplace due to increased interaction among distant countries).
104. See Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L.
REv. 101, 104 (1997) (stating that technology was perceived to be key to winning Cold
War); Reno, 521 U.S. at 849 (stating that specific configuration of Internet was designed
to allow defense community to communicate, even if portions of network were de-
stroyed in war).
105. See Adams, supra note 21, at 406-07 (stating that technicians did not realize
potential magnitude of their work); Gary Anthes, The History of the Future, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Oct. 3, 1994, at 101 (quoting Severo Ornstein, one of original architects
of Internet, responding to governments requests). Ornstein stated "[s]ure we could
build such a thing, but I don't see why anybody would want it." Anthes, supra; see also ex
rel. American Reporter v. Renno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
development of Internet and its beginnings as experimental project of U.S. Department
of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Administration).
106. See Adams, supra note 21, at 405-06 (noting that universities, at insistence of
government, contributed software to National Science Foundation Net ("NSF Net")).
NSF Net was created by the National Science Foundation to link remote supercomputer
research centers with researchers at remote academic and government institutions. Id.
at 405.
107. See Andrew J. Slitt, The Anonymous Publisher: Defamation of the Internet After
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The Internet does not resemble a typical consumer product,
because it is not owned, controlled, manufactured, or produced
by a single entity.10 8 Instead, the Internet is a collaborative effort
to cull together a network of computers. 9 This network oper-
ates by connecting computer networks and host computers to
each other," ° relying on the continuous communication be-
tween these computers to function."1 '
2. Applications and Functionality
By connecting computers around the globe into a seamless
web, the Internet provides a means to disseminate and receive
information from worldwide sources.1 2  Commentators note
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union and Zeran v. American Online, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 389, 392 (1998) (noting that growth of personal computer market coincided with
availability of Internet to mainstream public, especially with introduction of World
Wide Web).
108. See Henry M. Cooper, Jurisdictional Trends in Cyberspace, (visited Apr. 11, 2000)
<http://www.law.stetson.edu/courses/hcooper.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (noting that Internet, or National Information Infrastructure
("NII"), does not resemble tangible device).
109. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (noting that Advanced Research
Project Agency Network "provided an example for the development of a number of
civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of
people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information
from around the world.").
110. See Cooper, supra note 108 (providing concise and simple explanation of how
computer networks communicate). Henry Cooper stated:
How these connections work is rather complicated, but can be analogized to
how trains travel on train tracks. The information being communicated would
be the train. This information is translated by the computer into a universal
protocol, called TCP/IP, which uses a common name and address space so
that other computers connected to the network can locate and understand the
information being sent. The information travels through switches which are
computers that establish the path that the information must take to reach its
destination. These switches can be likened to the train's dispatch giving direc-
tions to the train's conductor on which tracks to travel on so that the train will
reach its destination. The path itself is called a router. Just as a train will
switch tracks when it can no longer use that track to reach its destination, the
information will switch routers when the router can no longer deliver the in-
formation to its destination. The Internet is unique in that there are millions
of routers to ensure that the information will reach its destination.
Id.
111. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that there
is no centralized control point of such computer network). Due to the lack of centrally
controlled servers, one single entity cannot control the flow of information that occurs
on the computer networks. Id.
112. See Yagura, supra note 14, at 303 (stating that Internet users can interact in
ways that were not possible previously).
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that the most powerful feature of the Internet is the ability to
interact almost instantaneously with users in remote areas of the
world.113 Anyone with Internet access can interact with a truly
global audience, 1 4 discussing a wide range of topics. 1 5
Generally, individuals can communicate on-line through a
variety on mechanisms, including e-mail,' 16 mail exploders, 17
newsgroups or bulletin boards,118 chat rooms, 1 9 real-time re-
mote computer utilization, 120 and remote information re-
trieval. 12' One commentator notes that most scholarly literature
does not distinguish between these communication mecha-
113. See Zembek, supra note 30, at 343-44 (noting that people many miles apart
can freely communicate). This communication allows millions of people to interact
and form relationships on a daily basis. Id. at 343. Although communicating with
others across the globe may seems novel today, such interaction did not exist 10 years
ago. Id. at 344; Marcelo Halpem & Ajay K. Mehrota, The Tangled Web of E-Commerce:
Identifying the Legal Risks of Online Marketing, 17 COMPUTER LAw 8 (2000) (stating that
companies can transact business around world with advanced Internet marketing tech-
niques).
114. See Cyber-Reach, supra note 12, at 1610 (noting that Internet provides source of
mass communication without considerable start-up and operating costs). This differs
from traditional mass communication systems, which require considerable expendi-
tures to construct and maintain. Id.
115. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (stating that "[ilt is no exaggeration to con-
clude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.").
116. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (describing e-mail, which allows
individual to send electronic messages to individuals or groups of individuals).
117. See id. (stating that mail exploders resemble e-mail to large group of people).
Mail exploders function in a simple two-step process: subscribers send messages to an
e-mail address and then these messages are automatically forwarded to every subscriber.
Id.
118. See id. (describing newsgroups as online discussion areas in which thousands
of conversations take place). Often, newsgroup discussions focus on a specific topic,
such as "comp" (computers), "soc" (social issues), or "sci" (science). Id. These topics
are often further subdivided to allow highly focused discussions to take place. Id. Reno
describes newsgroups as follows:
There are thousands of such groups, each serving to foster an exchange of
information or opinion on a particular topic running the gamut from, say, the
music of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to the Chicago Bulls.
About 100,000 new messages are posted everyday. In most newsgroups, post-
ings are automatically purged at regular intervals.
Id.
119. See id. (describing chatrooms as devices enabling individuals to engage in im-
mediate dialogue).
120. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834-36 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S.
844 (1997) (giving example of real-time remote computer utilization, which, for exam-
ple, would allow user to access library's on-line card catalog).
121. See id. (stating that remote information retrieval system is tool primarily used
for searching Internet).
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nisms.1 22 This generalization, however, fails to yield nuanced ap-
proaches, 123 and instead provides stereotyped results that often
mischaracterize the nature of the debate. 124  Therefore, this
Comment specifically focuses on computer bulletin boards.
Computer bulletin boards 25 are electronic "cork and pin"
bulletin boards, where Internet users can read, post, and re-
spond to messages. 126 These messages are not private, because
the posting is not routed exclusively from one computer to an-
other. 12 7 Instead, everyone who accesses the bulletin board can
read the postings.128
The bulletin board systems 129 maintain these messages, sav-
122. See Wu, supra note 31, at 1164 (stating that legal analysis of Internet should be
aware of architecture of Internet).
123. See id. at 1163 (stating that single model of analysis was effective when In-
ternet was in its infancy). This single model of analysis, however, fails today because the
dynamic nature of the Internet does not generalize well. Id.
124. See id. at 1165 (providing analogous example to stereotyped analysis of In-
ternet). Wu states that:
To understand this point, just think of the "network" of appliances in your
home: They all use the same standard of electricity (the basic protocol), but
then widely differ in what they offer the user. A television offers something
quite different than the power saw, even though they both use 110 volts of
electricity. This is the result of a deliberate choice. The design of the electric-
ity 'network' puts most of the power to decide functionality in the hands of the
appliance designer. The Internet, conceptually, is not all that different. Con-
trast this with the telephone network, where nearly. everything that matters
about the telephone comes from the basic standards to which all telephones
adhere. The difference between these networks is the result of a deliberate
and important decision, and one that cannot but have a decisive impact on
the legal analysis of any network.
Id.
125. See Michael Freitag, As Computer Bulletin Boards Grow, If It's Out There, It's Posted
Here, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1989, at 38 (stating that bulletin boards are also called elec-
tronic speakers' corners, because users discuss topics in same manner that people dis-
cuss ideas at Speakers' Corner in London's Hyde Park).
126. See Jeremy Stone Weber, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel
Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. lEs. L.
Rev. 235, 238 (1995) (defining computer bulletin board as computer version of tradi-
tional corkboard). Once a user gains access to computer bulletin board, the individual
can post original messages, respond to existing messages, or read existing messages. Id.
at 239; see also Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the First
Amendment, 39 FED. Com. L.J. 217 (1987) (commenting that computer bulletin boards
provide powerful means of communication)
127. SeeJensen, supra note 126, at 218 (noting that system operator places infor-
mation on bulletin board for any individual to access).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Kevin M. Savetz, Your Internet Consultant-TheFAQs of Life Online, (vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2000) <http://www.savetz.com> (on file with the Fordham International Law
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ing postings and relaying them to subsequent users.130 An indi-
vidual with the proper equipment can access these messages by
subscribing to an Internet service provider,13 1 logging on to the
Internet service provider's computer network, and then contact-
ing the desired bulletin board.1 32 Once logged on to a network,
the Internet user can choose from a wide range of bulletin
boards, with discussions ranging from politics and finance to
movies and trivia.133
There are numerous advantages to communicating by com-
puter bulletin boards as opposed to traditional forms of commu-
nication.' 34 First, communicating by computer bulletin boards
allows users to receive an unlimited amount of information. 13
5
Second, bulletin boards reveal very few social clues, encouraging
Journal) (describing Usenet as system through which large collection of Internet bulle-
tin boards is maintained).
The Usenet is simply the largest, most active and most varied discussion forum
in the world. Imagine a bulletin board on the wall. Imagine that as people
pass it, they glance at what's there, and if they have something to add, they
stick their note up, too. Now (here's the big leap), imagine that there are
thousands of bulletin boards in this building, and that there are actually tens
of thousands of buildings throughout the world, each with its own identical
copy of the bulletin board. Got it? That's Usenet.
Id.
130. See Judith Berck, It's No Longer Just Techno-Hobbyists Who Meet by Modem, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1992, at 12F (noting that sysops, or system operators, create and main-
tain computer bulletin boards).
131. See Carl Thorsen, et. al., Rules of the Road, AMERICA'S NETWORK, Apr. 15, 1999
(defining Internet service provider ("ISP") as company that provides voice and data
services to Internet users). Often, a consumer must pay a monthly service fee in order
to access an ISP's server or Internet portal, which provides consumers access to the
Internet. Id.
132. See Sheldon J. Burnett, Actual Malice on Computer Bulletin Boardsi?, (visited Apr.
11, 2000) <http://www.lawinfo.com/forum/bbmalice.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) (indicating that anyone can access bulletin board with proper
software and subscription to Internet service provider); see also Rex S. Heinke &
Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on the Electronic Frontier, COM-
PUTER LAw., July 1994, at 1 (stating that many people gain access to bulletin boards by
paying fee to ISP).
133. See Burnett, supra note 132 (indicating that more than 100,000 computer bul-
letin boards exist, with topics ranging from cars to sports).
134. See John D. Faucher, Let the Chips Fall Where They May: Choice of Law in Com-
puter Bulleting Board Defamation Cases, 26 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1045, 1045-47 (1993)
(describing advantages that bulletin boards have over existing methods of communica-
tion); seeJensen, supra note 126, at 223 (arguing that bulletin boards possesses distinct
advantages over existing forms of communication).
135. See Faucher, supra note 134, at 1078 n.6 (describing enormous databases that
are available to individuals online).
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individuals to interact freely.'1 6 Finally, users can converse in-
stantly on a wide range of topics with people from across the
globe.137
3. Cybertorts and Cybercrimes
Scholars note that the global reach of the Internet has both
positive and negative implications. 3 8 While the Internet facili-
tates the worldwide exchange of information, it also increases
international conflicts and litigation. 39 The new wave of of-
fenses occurring on the Internet has received the monikers of
Cybertorts and Cybercrimes. 140 Although online offenses resem-
ble actionable offenses in the physical world, they have aspects
136. See id. at 1047 (stating that individuals communicate openly online); see also
Jensen, supra note 126, at 223 (noting that bulletin board conversations are anony-
mous, encouraging individuals to communicate freely). Under such circumstances,
identity, appearance, and personality may become unimportant. Jensen, supra, at 224.
137. SeeJensen, supra note 126, at 224 (commenting that instant interaction possi-
ble through Internet bulletin boards avoid slow process of communication by mail).
138. See 143 CONG. Rac. E1633 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Representa-
tive Robert W. Goodlatte introducing Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997) (not-
ing that Internet facilitates community discussion, while potentially overriding local
standards). Representative Robert W. Goodlatte further stated:
The ability of the World Wide Web to penetrate every home and community
across the globe has both positive and negative implications-while it can be
an invaluable source of information and means of communication, it can also
override community values and standards, subjecting them to whatever more
may or may not be found online. In short, the Internet is a challenge to the
sovereignty of civilized communities, States, and nations to describe what is
appropriate and decent behavior ... The legislation I am introducing today
will protect the rights of citizens in each State to decide through their State
legislatures if they want to allow gambling within their borders and not have
that right taken away by offshore, fly-by-night operators.
Id.; see also Menezes, supra note 9 (stating that long-term effects of globalization are
uncertain). There are some effects, however, that are readily apparent. Menezes,
supra. Globalization has destroyed cultural differences and economic barriers. Id.
Also, globalization has created a race towards the bottom, encouraging countries to
adopt lax regulations in order to attract business. Id.; see also Thomas R. Lee, In Rem
Jurisdiction In Cyberspace, 74 WASH L. Rxv. 97, 98 (2000) (stating that Internet has cre-
ated new problems that existing legal mechanisms have been unable to solve).
139. See Losing, supra note 63, at 737 (discussing increase in international litiga-
tion due to movement of goods and services across borders). Often, a litigant who wins
a money judgment in an international case will have to enforce the judgment in the
defendant's country. Id.
140. See Anello, supra note 19, at 1 (discussing increase in, and types of, computer
crime). Robert Annello states:
News stories of the use of computers to commit crimes and to disrupt govern-
ment and business have become common, including such acts as: e-mail
threats of school violence, release of computer viruses, copyright infringe-
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that are wholly unique to the Internet.14 ' Internet offenses oc-
cur quickly and transcend traditional concepts of borders, mak-
ing law enforcement difficult.1 42 Also, Internet offenses afford
individuals anonymity, shielding their identity from law enforce-
ment agents and victims.'43
Computer bulletin boards serve as the medium for a host of
Cybertorts, including conversion, 44 fraud, 45 and electronic tres-
pass. 146  Defamation, however, is an increasing problem.1 47
Since the bulletin boards provide an easy and inexpensive way
ment, child pornography, securities fraud, computer espionage and the trans-
mission of nuclear secrets to foreign governments.
Id.
141. See Todd Wallack, Top Cops To Tackle Web Crime, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 10,
2000, at B1 (stating that Internet enables individuals to commit crimes across globe,
raising jurisdictional questions).
142. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE IMPACT OF THE IN-
TERNET ON THE MISSION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALS 6 (Mar. 12, 2000) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that Internet poses challenges to law enforce-
ment agencies because Internet is "borderless, instantaneous, anonymous, dynamic,
and changing.").
143. See Sherri Hunter, Defamation and Privacy Laws Face the Internet, COMM. LAW.,
Fall 1999 (stating that anonymous Internet communications may render computer-law
debates moot due to inability to find and prosecute offenders).
144. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Electronic Bulletin Boards Need Editing. No They Don't,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, at D4 (stating that online conversion occurs with credit card
numbers). Some bulletin boards post valid credit card numbers, allowing individuals to
use the numbers to charge purchases. Id.
145. See Stacey Hartmann, Free Speech or Cheap Shots? Electronic Bulletin Boards Pro-
vide Platform for Corporate Criticism, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 25, 1999, at El (noting that inves-
tors use bulletin boards to share information that may or may not be true). Recently,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has become more involved with
regulating such fraudulent activities, specifically through the monitoring and prosecu-
tion of Internet frauds. Id. Internet frauds include sham offerings and illegal touting
of stocks. Id. In July 1998, the SEC announced the first nationwide Internet fraud
sting, filing 23 actions against 44 defendants. Id.
146. See Zeviar-Geese, supra note 29 (defining Internet trespass as unauthorized
access to individual's computer system, notably through use of computer viruses); see
also Chuck Sudetic, Bulgarians Linked to Computer Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at A9
(stating that Bulgaria was source of numerous computer viruses during 1980s). A virus
spreads either through floppy disks, computer modems, or computer networks. Id.
Once on a computer, a virus can destroy the computer's memory and any information
stored on it. Id.
147. See Kathleen Ostrander, Internet Remarks Bring Suit, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 12, 1998
(paraphrasing Barry Orton, telecommunications professor at University of Wisconsin-
Madison, stating that there is likely to be increase in anti-corporate communications
online); see also Robert C. Cumbow & GregoryJ. Wrenn, Reputation On (the) Line: Defa-
mation and the Internet, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1996 (stating that Pacific Northwest
computer retailer attributes its bankruptcy to defamatory comments posted on com-
puter bulletin board).
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for a speaker to reach a large audience,' 48 disgruntled customers
and employees have used them to voice their concerns over a
company, regardless if the complaints are justified. 4 ' Also, due
to the sheer size of the Internet, bulletin board comments are
almost guaranteed to gather attention, unlike a scathing letter to
a newspaper editor, which may not be printed. 5 '
C. Jurisdiction Problems Created by the Internet
One commentator notes that bringing suit over a Cybertorts
is a novel cause of action that has not received extensive judicial
consideration.15 ' When such cases are brought, courts have
struggled with questions about the role of lawmakers on the In-
ternet'5 2 and the community standards that should govern. 15 3
Cybertort litigation,15 4 however, frequently has concerned a sin-
gle issue: the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate. 5
148. SeeJensen, supra note 125, at 220 (noting that individual can start bulletin
board for initial investment of US$2500).
149. See Cumbow & Wrenn, supra note 147 (stating that Internet communications
provide forum for disgruntled consumers and employees to discuss company). Often,
this discussion disparages the offending company, its products, or its personnel,
whether the individual actually has a legitimate complaint. Id.
150. See Ostrander, supra note 147 (quoting Barry Orton discussing act of posting
comments on computer bulletin-board). Orton stated: "It is easy to do and you get
publicity you are not likely to get with say, a letter to the editor, which may or may not
get printed." Id. But Orton downplayed the importance of bulletin board posting,
stating:
Anybody that reads these bulletin boards doesn't take this information as gos-
pel. It can be anybody writing about anything using anyone's name. You
don't know what kind of ax the person has to grind and it's not credible, like
something you would read in a newspaper, because it has no attribution.
Id.
151. See Yagura, supra note 14, at 301 (stating that courts have not established any
definitive rules in Internet personal jurisdiction cases).
152. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 22 (stating that determination of who should
be lawmakers for Internet is more important than more popular issue: law enforce-
ment on Internet). The authors argue that the Internet community should develop its
own rules and norms. Id.
153. See ABA Prospectus, supra note 37 (stating that as long as laws differ among
jurisdictions, procedural questions will be important question for E-commerce).
154. See Mike France, Free Speech on the Net? Not Quite, Bus. Wv, Feb. 28, 2000
(noting that majority of Internet cases were filed in second half of 1999; thus very few
have reached their final disposition).
155. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D.
Mass. 1997) (stating that "[t]he Internet, which is a worldwide interconnected com-
puter network, undoubtedly challenges the 'territorial-based concepts' that court have
traditionally applied to problem of personal jurisdiction."); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "[t]he Internet, a new and
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1. Bringing Suit over Cybertorts
Internet communications are not geographically depen-
dent, but disseminated globally.156 Moreover, the configuration
of the Internet has the potential to bypass quickly157 traditional
jurisdictional limitations. 58 An analysis based on geographic
boundaries, however, is insufficient when computer-mediated
activities, especially bulletin boards, are involved.
159
rapidly developing means of mass communication and information exchange, raises
difficult questions regarding the scope of [a] court's personal jurisdiction in the con-
text of due process jurisprudence."); Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that "[wlith the global revolution
looming on the horizon, the development of the law concerning the permissible scope
of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its infant stages."); Vitullo v. Velocity
Powerboats, Inc., 1998 WL 246152, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1998) (stating that "Defend-
ants' motion requires this court to consider one of the newest areas of law of personal
jurisdiction: effect of the Internet."); Aristotle G. Mirzaan, Y2K Who Cares? We Have
Bigger Problems: Choice of Law in Electronic Contracts, 6 RicH. J.L. & TECH. 18, (1999) (last
visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i4/article3.html> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that personal jurisdiction arises in
every Internet-related suit when defendant is not physically present in forum).
156. See Gigante, supra note 13, at 524-25 (discussing inability of technology to
limit geographical area within which certain Internet sites can be viewed). The In-
ternet transcends geographical borders, limiting states to a minimal role in the regula-
tion of the Internet. Id. at 548. But see United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.
1996) (discussing ability of Internet content providers to control information on In-
ternet). The court held that the operator of an adult billboard could determine the
destination of material through the use of passwords. Thomas, supra.
157. See George P. Long III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55
U. PrrT. L. REv. 1177, 1180 (1994) (describing speed with which information can travel
on Internet). An Internet user can travel across the globe in a matter of seconds. Id.
For example, an Internet user can travel at speeds of up to two billion bits per second;
such speeds enable a user to move the entire Encyclopedia Britannica from New York
to California in less than two seconds. Id.
158. See Maltz, supra note 33 (stating that, in long-term, individual governments
will not be able to regulate Internet). First, the configuration of the Internet ensures
that information does not travel through a central location. Id. Next, users can avoid
government prohibitions by quickly switching to a less repressive regime. Id. Finally,
technological advancements always lead to a legislative lag in regulation. Id. But see
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. Rev. 501,
515 (1999) (arguing that ability to regulate Internet depends upon architecture of In-
ternet, which government can alter).
159. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that
Internet has ability to circumvent geographical boundaries). Specifically, the court
states in Finding 86:
Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that con-
tent from entering any community. Unlike the newspaper, broadcast station,
or cable system, Internet technology gives a speaker a potential worldwide au-
dience. Because the Internet is a network of networks ... any network con-
nected to the Internet has the capacity to send and receive information to any
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In response to the Internet's ability to confound the tradi-
tional bases for jurisdiction, scholars have offered a variety of
solutions, which fall into three general categories." ° The propo-
nents of the first category state that the jurisdictional problems
created by the Internet cannot be solved and that Cyberspace
cannot be regulated. 161 These commentators state that the abil-
ity to avoid government regulation by shifting geographic loca-
tions destroys regulations based on territorial notions and, there-
fore, the government should not regulate the Internet. 162
Commentators in the second category argue that govern-
ments must establish new rules for determining jurisdiction.163
One commentator within this category, John Perry Barlow, be-
lieves that online communications have altered human interac-
tion and, therefore, an alteration of the existing laws is neces-
sary.16 4 Within this category, the approaches have varied consid-
other network. Hotwired Ventures, for example, cannot prevent its materials
on mixology from entering communities that have no interest on the topic.
Id. at 844.
160. See Christoper P. Beall, The Scientological Defenstration of Choice-of-Law Doctrines
for Publication Torts on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 361 (1997)
(stating that commentators have suggested numerous evolutions in law to deal with
problems created by Internet, specifically choice-of-law).
161. See Cyberspace Regulation, supra note 19, at 1681 (summarizing various claims
that Internet cannot be regulated). This article notes that commentators within this
category often base their claims on appeals to state sovereignty. Id. at 1680. These
claims can be divided into three groups. Id. at 1681. Some commentators claim that
regulating cyberspace would infringe upon the sovereignty of other states. Id. Other
scholars espouse that the Internet constitutes its own state and, therefore, any regula-
tion of the Internet is illegitimate. Id. While other scholars claim that the Internet has
eroded the power of the state to regulate, thereby making attempts to regulate ineffec-
tive. Id.
162. See Joel R. Reidenburg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45
EMORY LJ. 911, 912 (1996) (arguing that new legal paradigms must be developed that
recognize complexity of Internet). But see Sivia Ascarelli, Two On-Line Service Companies
Investigated in Racial Hatred Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1996, at B2 (describing ability of
German prosecutor to shut down website that contained neo-Nazi information).
163. See Beall, supra note 160, at 361-63 (describing earliest arguments advocating
creation of new legal doctrine for Internet). But see Timothy Wu, %%en Law & the
Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 171, 173 (2000) (stating that no demand exists for
separate law of Cyberspace).
164. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents
and Copyrights in the DigitalAge, WIRED ONLINE, Mar. 1994 (visited Apr. 11, 2000) <http:/
/www.ram.org/ramblings/philosophy/fmp/economy-of-ideas.html> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that Internet allows individuals not only to
convey ideas solely through impersonal, computer network, but also to create powerful
tools that never exist in tangible form). Since ideas and expressions conveyed over the
Internet often lack a phyiscal manifestation, the nature of property rights is uncertain.
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erably, from establishing rules based on federal common law,16
maritime law,' 66 or satellite transmission regulations.
67
A commentator who falls within the third category proposes
that governments simply apply existing rules to Internet commu-
nications. 168 Commentators in this category acknowledge that
the Internet, like traditional communications networks, 169 en-
ables individuals to harm others across state lines. 17  These com-
mentators also acknowledge that courts will exercise jurisdiction
over Cybertorts before new jurisdictional rules are imple-
mented.' 7 1
Id. John Perry Barlow advocates that governments declare a moritorium on litigation,
legislation, and treaties until a new social contract emerges, solidifying consensus on
Internet property issues. Id. Once a collective expression emerges among Internet
users, the government can implement legislation that reflects the new order of human
interaction. Id.
165. See Beall, supra note 160, at 368-73 (summarizing arguments for creation of
federal common law). The U.S. Constitution authorizes federal courts to create a fed-
eral common law for activities that implicate federal interests, which include the regula-
tion and conservation of the national telephone Internet. Id. Therefore, federal courts
can create a federal common law to govern the Internet. Id.
166. See Gigante, supra note 13, at 549 (describing analogy between Internet and
high seas). Maritime law is based on the notion that international commerce would not
exist if a ocean vessels had to comply with the laws of every country claiming jurisdiction
over the high seas. Id. Therefore, maritime law states that the laws of a ship's registry
determine jurisdiction, regardless of where the ship is located. Id. This analogy is not
effective for Internet communications because data, unlike ships, actually penetrate the
literal borders of a country. Id. Also, ocean vessels must stop at a port for inspection
before unloading, which would be a highly unacceptable prospect for Internet commu-
nications. Id.
167. See id. (describing Council of Europe regulations that confer jurisdiction
over satellite transmission on country from which broadcast occurred).
168. See Michael L. Russell, Back to the Basics: Resisting Novel and Extreme Approaches
to the Law of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 157, 178 (1999)
(arguing that courts do not need to formulate new test for personal jurisdiction,
Cybertort analysis). Instead, proper application of existing rules should produce consis-
tent results. Id.
169. See Yagura, supra note 14, at 302 (stating that framework for jurisdictional
analysis already exists for communications devices, and since Internet is simply a com-
munications device, jurisdictional rules already exist).
170. See id. at 309 (stating that ability to quickly and easily cause harm across state
borders with Internet does not change jurisdictional analysis).
171. See Dale M. Cendali & Rebecca Weinstein, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace,
N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1998 (noting that courts apply traditional personal jurisdiction analysis
to Internet cases). See, e.g., Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc. [1999] No. C 20546/99,
1999 Ont. CJ. LEXIS 16867 (Ontario Super. Ct. June 14, 1999) (exercisingjurisdiction
in Canadian lawsuit against bulk e-mailer); Queneau v. Leroy [1998] E.C.C. 47 (T.G.I.
1997) (exercising jurisdiction in European lawsuit involving Internet copyrights); Brit-
ish Telecomm. v. One In A Million Ltd. [1999] 1 W.L.R. 903 (C.A. 1998) (exercising
jurisdiction in British lawsuit against fraudulent domain name seller).
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2. Specific and General Internet Jurisdiction
U.S. courts have addressed Internet-related jurisdiction
problems on numerous occasions1 72 and they have applied and
adapted existing jurisdictional rules to the Internet. 173  One
scholar has noted that these decisions will likely influence for-
eign tribunals when they face similar issues. 174 Therefore, an
analysis of relevant U.S. case law is warranted. 175
The majority of U.S. cases involving the Internet focus on
whether an individual's Internet activities give rise to specific,
rather than general, jurisdiction.176 As many courts have noted,
a non-resident defendant's website cannot give rise to general
jurisdiction.177 If such a rule were established, then the personal
jurisdiction requirement would be a mere formality, subjecting
172. See Dagesse v. Plant, No. 98-713-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *23 (D.N.H.
Jan. 5, 2000) (stating that "a large number of federal courts have already considered the
effects of a defendant's Internet activities on personal jurisdiction").
173. See Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Surgical Products Ltd., 64 F. Supp.
2d 448, 451 ((E.D. Pa 1999) (stating that "[w]hile the court acknowledges that new
technology will necessarily have an effect on many aspects of the law, it is untenable to
suggest that all prior jurisprudence is irrelevant to the Internet."); see also Weber v.Jolly
Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating that "[a]lthough the Internet is a
new medium that raises new issues for the courts, district courts have successfully ap-
plied the principles established by International Shoe and its progeny to cases involving
the Internet.").
174. See Renault, supra note 18 (stating that precedents established by U.S. courts
will most likely influence Canadian courts).
175. Numerous cases specifically involving allegedly defamatory postings on com-
puter bulletin boards have been settled out of court. See, e.g. Suarez Corp. Industries v.
Meeks, No. 267513 (Ohio Cuyahoga County 1994) (involvingjournalist, Brook Meeks,
who posted allegedly defamatory messages on computer bulletin board about plaintiff);
Medaphone Corp. v. DeNigris, No. 92-3785 (D.N.J. 1993) (involving corporation who
sued individual for posting on bulletin board that "corporation was having hard time.").
176. See Molnlycke, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 452 n.3 (recognizing that "most of the cases
premising jurisdiction on Internet activity have ruled on the basis of specific jurisdic-
tion"); Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570
n.6 (E.D. Va. 1999) (recognizing that "vast majority of Internet-based personal jurisdic-
tion cases involve specific jurisdiction.").
177. See Molnlycke, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (discussing general jurisdiction and mere
accessibility). The court stated that it:
[D]isagrees with plaintiff's more fundamental premise and holds that the es-
tablishment of a website through which customers can order products, does
not, on its own, suffice to establish general jurisdiction. To hold that the pos-
sibility of ordering products from a website establishes general jurisdiction
would effectively hold that any corporation with such a website is subject to
general jurisdiction in every state. The court is not willing to take such a step.
Id.; see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.4 (D.S.C.
1999) (stating that "[a] finding of jurisdiction based on the fact that the web page is
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individuals from across the globe to lawsuits in the United
States.178 Courts, however, have based specific jurisdiction on a
variety of theories.179
a. Sliding Commercial Scale
Many courts have applied an analytical framework based on
a sliding scale, finding the ability of a court to exercise jurisdic-
tion to be directly proportional to the type of activity conducted
online. 18 0 At one end of the scale is interactive, commercial web-
sites."' These sites permit corporations to contract with resi-
dents of a foreign jurisdiction over the Internet. 18 2 At the oppo-
site end of the scale are passive websites that merely post infor-
mation on the Internet." 3 In the middle of the scale are
accessible in the forum means that there would be nationwide jurisdiction over any who
posts a web page.").
178. See McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, 1996 WL
753991 at *3 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that "allowing computer interaction via the web
to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal juris-
diction requirement as it currently exists"); Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium
Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 (D.Or. 1999) (refusing to find general jurisdiction
based on reasoning in McDonough); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberg, 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (stating that jurisdiction based on Internet website would cre-
ate worldwide service of process, which is clearly inconsistent with traditional case law).
179. See Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Juisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More Is Re-
quired on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 925, 939 (1998) (stating that
current case law is inconsistent, irrational, and irreconcilable); Beth I. Boland & Diane
Gwin, The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction Under the Constitution: In What State, Exactly, Is
the Internet Located?, BOSTON L.J., Jan. 2000, at 16 (noting that determination of poten-
tial liability is unpredictable due to inconsistency in case law).
180. See Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that "likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitution-
ally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity
that an entity conducts over the Internet."). Some courts, however, have used the Zippo
analysis to determine whether general jurisdiction was appropriate. Soma Med. Int'l v.
Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999); Harbuck v. Aramco, Inc.,
No. 99-1971, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16892, 1999 WL 999431, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21
1999); Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467-68 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
181. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (stating that individual falls within this category
"when a defendant clearly does business over the Internet.").
182. See, e.g., id. (describing company that contracted with approximately 3000 in-
dividuals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania); CompuServe, Inc., v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (findingjurisdiction when non-resident defend-
ant had entered into contract with plaintiff and repeatedly transmitted files to forum
state). The court noted that CompuServe "acted as Patterson's distributor, albeit elec-
tronically and not physically." Id. at 1265; see also Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998
F. Supp. 738, 744 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding jurisdiction over non-resident defendant
because plaintiff signed contract with defendant over Internet).
183. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (describing passive website as advertisement
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websites that allow an individual to exchange some information
with the host computer."l 4
Many courts have recognized the utility of the Zippo test,18 5
which considers the actual nature of the contacts between the
defendant and the forum. 186 Other courts, however, have only
found the test useful when the case fits neatly into one of the
extremes of either fully interactive or passive websites.' 7 Some
scholars have condemned the test, stating that even passive web-
"that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in
it.").
184. See id. (describing analysis that should be applied to websites in middle cate-
gory). The court stated that "the middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites
where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the
exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and com-
mercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site." Id. (inter-
nal citations omitted); see also Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999 F.
Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (reformulating Zippo test according to categories). The
court stated:
The first type of contact is when the defendant clearly does business over the
Internet. If the defendant enters into contract with residents of a foreign ju-
risdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmissions of computer
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. The second type of
contact occurs when a user can exchange information with the host computer.
In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the
level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on the Website. The third type of contact involves the posting of
information or advertisements on an Internet Web Site which is accessible to
users in foreign jurisdictions. Personal jurisdiction is not exercised for this
type of contact.
Blackburn, 999 F. Supp. at 639 (citations and quotations omitted).
185. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1119.
186. See, e.g., Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97-C-8745 1998 WL 246152 at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1998) (stating that consideration of nature of contacts prevents
jurisdictional requirements from being destroyed); Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed
Corporation, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (stating that "the court finds
this analysis helpful in this relatively new and changing area of law and is of the opinion
that the evidence plaintiff presents in the instant case most closely aligns with the sec-
ond category described above."); Atlantech Distribution, Inc. v. Credit General Ins. Co.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (D. Md. 1998) (stating that Zippo test was widely accepted and
holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over defendant due to existence
of passive website); SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Investments, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35
(D. Kan. 1997) (applying Zippo test in general personal jurisdiction case).
187. See, e.g., Dagesse v. Plant Hotel, No. 98-713-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at
*31 (D.C. N.H. Jan. 5, 2000) (stating that Zippo test is useful when website fits into either
extreme); J. Christopher Gooch, The Internet, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Federal Long-
Arm Statute: Rethinking the Concept of Jurisdiction, 15 ARIz. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 635, 654
(noting that determination of interactivity is difficult with proliferation of websites and
diversity of Internet users).
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sites have the potential to cause harm. 18
b. Passive Websites
In numerous cases, courts have refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion over non-resident defendants when the defendant's sole
contact with the forum state was advertising over the Internet. 8 9
Courts have stated that Internet advertisements do not satisfy the
constitutional requirements of purposeful availment and sub-
stantial contact.' 90 Instead, these courts have found that In-
ternet advertisements are similar to solicitations in national
magazines, 19 ' which do not constitute continuous and substan-
tial contact with the forum state. 192
188. See Michael Traynor, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: 1999 and Looking
Ahead, 564 PLI/PAT 109, 117 (1999) (stating that Zippo analysis has some shortcomings
because posting defamatory comments or competitors' trade secrets causes harm re-
gardless of type of website on which information is displayed); Todd D. Leitstein, A
Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REv. 565, 566 (1999) (arguing
that forced application of existing jurisdictional rules to Internet contacts has created
confusing and contradictory results). Todd Leitstein also notes that the Zippo court's
definition of interactive website would encompass all websites. Leitstein, supra, at 566;
see also Boland & Gwin, supra note 179, at 17 (stating that it is difficult to determine
outcome of case when Internet site falls in middle of Zippo scale).
189. See, e.g., Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997)
(refusing to find jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who advertised over Internet,
but did not sell goods or services in forum state); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-
3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (finding court lacked jurisdiction
over nonresident defend ant whose website is merely viewable by residents of forum
state); Bensusan v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding court's exercise of juris-
diction improper when only contact with forum state was Internet website).
190. See, e.g., Weber. v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 334 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding
that jurisdiction based on Internet advertising would violate Due Process Clause of 14th
Amendment).
191. See Hearst, No. 96-3620 1997 WL 97097 at *12 (finding that "Internet website
is analogous to an advertisement in a national publication and this does not constitute
sufficient contacts with New York to provide the Court with personal jurisdiction over
[defendant]."); Weber, 977 F. Supp. at 334 (agreeing with "finding in Hearst that adver-
tising on the Internet falls under the same rubric as advertising in a national maga-
zine.").
192. See, e.g., Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine, 773 F.2d 539, 542 (3d
Cir. 1985) (holding that advertising in national magazine does not constitute continu-
ous and substantial contact with forum state); Giangola v. Walt Disney Co., 753 F. Supp.
148, 156 (D.N.J. 1990) (stating that "[iun an age of modern advertising and national
media publications and markets, plaintiffs' argument that such conduct would make a
defendant amenable to suit wherever the advertisements were aired would substantially
undermine the law of personal jurisdiction.").
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c. Internet Advertisements and Off-Line Contacts
In cases involving advertising over the Internet, courts have
exercised jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when the
defendant purposefully directed his Internet activities towards
the forum state.193 The federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri held that a website that encourages individu-
als in the forum state to add their names to a mailing list was
sufficient to establish jurisdiction.'94 Another court held that
the existence of a website coupled with a toll-free telephone
number is sufficient. 9 The District Court of Arizona held that a
website coupled with paper contracts and sales with the forum
state is sufficient. 196
193. See, e.g., Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th
Cir. 1998) (finding jurisdiction where "there has been 'something more' to 'indicate
that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activities in a sub-
stantial way to the forum state.'" (citations omitted)).
194. See Maritz, Inc., v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(stating that nature of defendant's contacts with forum state favors exercise of jurisdic-
tion). The court specifically stated:
With CyberGold's website, CyberGold automatically and indiscriminately re-
sponds to each and every internet user who accesses its website. Through its
website, CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertising informa-
tion to all internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted
globally. Thus, CyberGold's contacts are of such a quality and nature, albeit a
very new quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, that they
favor the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant.
Id. But see Desktop Technologies, Inc. v. Colorworks Reproduction & Design, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 98-5029, 1999 WL 98572 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25 1999) (holding that inviting
users to print out order form and to fax completed order form to company was not
sufficient basis to exercise jurisdiction); Grutkowski v. Steamboat Lake Guides & Outfit-
ters, Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-1453, 1998 WL 962042 at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that web-
site's use of e-mail link that only permits readers to send questions is insufficient basis
on which to exercise jurisdiction); Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999
F. Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (rejecting notion that e-mail requests for information
could provide basis for personal jurisdiction).
195. See Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996) (finding jurisdiction over website that contained company's toll-free telephone
number). But see Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding website consisting of general information would not give rise to jurisdiction).
196. See EDIAS Software International, L.L.C. v. BASIS International Ltd., 947 F.
Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding jurisdiction due to contracts with parties in forum
state). The court stated:
The pleadings and oral arguments of the parties indicate that [the defendant]
has purposefully availed itself of the protections and privileges of Arizona law
based on the contractual relationship between [the plaintiff] and [the defend-
ant] ....
Id. at 421; see also CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261-68 (1996) (holding that
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3. Specific Jurisdiction and Defamation Cases
Although the Zippo court's approach has been widely ap-
plied, another line of cases developed around traditional defa-
mation claims.197 These cases apply the reasoning in traditional
media cases to Internet defamation claims,198 finding personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants when the effect of the
tortious act was felt in the forum state. 199 While defendants have
argued that traditional publications differ from Internet publica-
tions, 200 courts have been unwilling to accept this analysis.
2 1
individual who purposefully contracted and communicated via Internet was subject to
jurisdiction in state where contracted party resided).
197. See, e.g., Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322 (applying effects test to extortion case);
EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 420 (applying Calder effects test to transmission of defamatory e-
mail messages); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97-C-4943, 1997 WL
733905 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1997) (applying effects test to trademark claim); Califor-
nia Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (find-
ingjurisdiction over allegedly libelous statements circulated on computer network due
to forseeability of injury in forum state); Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 322 NJ.
Super. 187, 730 A.2d 854 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (applying effects test to com-
puter bulletin board defamation claim).
198. SeeYagura, supra note 14, at 310 (stating that traditional cases involve newspa-
pers, magazines, mail, telephone calls, fax, or television and radio broadcasts that carry
defamatory meanings across state lines); Perritt, supra note 67, at 17-18 (stating that
traditional media cases are helpful in personal jurisdiction determinations involving
Cybertorts). Print publications have similar characteristics to electronic publications.
Perritt, supra. Both are disseminated from central locations and both can come into
contact with multiple jurisdictions. Id.; see also Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (stating
that Internet advertisements differ from traditional publication because Internet is al-
ways accessible).
199. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (stating that defendant knew
brunt of injury would be felt in forum state, and therefore, could anticipate being sub-
ject to suit there); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (ap-
plying effects test to Internet bulletin board defamation case); Perritt, supra note 67, at
17-18 (stating that "publication usually satisfies minimum contacts analysis if it has sub-
stantial circulation in jurisdiction or if defendant publisher intended to cause injury in
the jurisdiction.").
200. See California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (arguing that comment on bulletin board differs from medium of
communication in Calder).
201. See id. (stating that "the conversational format.., does not affect the jurisdic-
tional analysis"). The court further stated "It would be both unfair, in light of the fo-
rum-related activity, and inefficient to require plaintiffs who have suffered an economic
injury as a result of defendant's intentional conduct to sue in the defendant's home
states.., in which the known recipients of the [bulletin board messages] reside." Id. at
1364; see also EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 420 (stating that defendant "should not be permit-
ted to take advantage of modern technology through an Internet Web page and forum
and simultaneously escape traditional notions of jurisdiction").
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a. Bulletin Board Postings
Some courts have found that posting information on a bul-
letin board cannot be construed as an act purposefully directed
at a forum state.202 These courts have analyzed a variety of fac-
tors including the origin, destination, subject matter, and effect
of the postings.2 13 Courts have also examined the parties them-
selves, where they live, where they are headquartered, and where
they are incorporated.0 4 One commentator noted that these
cases only allow jurisdiction in the state in which the sender or
recipient resides.20 5
b. Jurisdiction by Location of Server
At least one state court has based the ability to exercise juris-
diction solely on the location of the server.20 6 Some commenta-
202. See Mallinckrodt Medical Inc. v. Sonus, 989 F. Supp. 265 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that mere posting of message on computer bulletin boards is not sufficient
basis for court to exercise jurisdiction). The court stated that the posting cannot be
perceived as transacting business in the District of Columbia. Id. at 271. Blakey, 322
N.J. Super. at 187 (holding that posting of messages was not sufficient contact with
forum state for court to exercise jurisdiction); Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (stating that
"posting of messages to ... USENET discussion groups technically differs from the
maintenance of a 'passive' Web page because messages are actively disseminated to
those who participate in such groups.").
203. See Mallinckrodt, 989 F. Supp. at 273 (stating that "[w]hile the transmission of
the message occurred from outside the District of Columbia, there is no indication that
plaintiffs themselves suffered any injury in the District of Columbia .... .").
204. See id. at 271-72 (analyzing nexus between allegedly defamatory bulletin
board posting and forum state). The court stated:
The AOL transmission from Seattle to Virginia which was subsequently posted
on an AOL electronic bulletin board and may have been accessed by AOL
subscribers in the District of Columbia, cannot be construed as "transacting
business" in the District of Columbia. The message was not sent to or from the
District of Columbia, the subject matter had nothing to do with the District of
Columbia, and neither the plaintiffs nor [defendants] reside in, have their
headquarters in, or are incorporated in the District. Other than the fact that
some people may have visited the electronic bulletin board and read the
message from here, the AOL posting has no connection to this jurisdiction.
Id. at 272.
205. See Jurisdiction Declined Where Posting Read, M2 PREsswiRE, Feb. 26, 1998 (quot-
ing David Flint, partner in Intellectual Property & Technology Law Group of MacRob-
erts, stating that "it would appear that . . . legal jurisdiction will only lie where the
sender, and possibly the recipient (if the sender knows this), resides.").
206. See Krantz v. Airline Pilots Association, Int'l., 245 Va. 202, 427 S.E. 2d 326
(1993) (holding that use of bulletin board, physically located within Virginia facility,
satisfied jurisdictional requirements); Mitchell v. McGowan, Civ. No. 98-1026-A, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18587 at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18 1998) (unpublished disposition) (stating
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tors dismiss this position due to the ability of Internet users to
circumvent legal regimes.20 7 Also, such an analysis would allow
individuals to forum-shop, anticipating where the best legal envi-
ronment exists and connecting to a server within that jurisdic-
tion.208
II. BRAINTECH v. KOSTIUK A CANADIAN RESPONSE
On March 18, 1999, the Court of Appeals for British Colum-
bia released the first Canadian appellate court decision to ad-
dress the enforcement of a foreign Cybertort judgment.20 9 In
refusing to enforce the judgment of a U.S. District Court, the
B.C. Court of Appeals said that the simple act of posting content
on the Internet does not put Canadians in jeopardy of violating
the defamation laws of foreign jurisdictions.2 10 The ruling estab-
lishes that the mere posting of information on a website,
although defamatory, does not constitute a real and substantial
connection to a jurisdiction in which the website can be ac-
cessed.2 11 Therefore, the B.C. Court of Appeals stated that Ca-
nadian courts will not defer to comity and recognize the judg-
ments of foreign courts unless a more substantial link to the fo-
rum can be established than merely posting comments on a
computer bulletin board.21
2
that Krantz did not apply to defendant because bulletin board was physically located
outside court's geographical jurisdiction).
207. See Oberding & Norderhaug, supra note 22 (stating that this theory allows
individuals to remove themselves from state's regulatory jurisdiction, decreasing effec-
tiveness of state's governing power).
208. See id. (noting that individuals could technologically forum shop to obtain
most favorable legal environment).
209. See Wisener, supra note 7 (stating that "[e]xperts say the decision by British
Columbia's top court is the most important of its kind for Internet law in Canada and
may have wide implications for issues as diverse as free speech rights and electronic
commerce.").
210. See BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 1999 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020 at *33 (refusing to
enforce judgment of District Court of Harris County, Texas). The court stated that
"[iun these circumstances the complainant must offer better proof that the defendant
has entered Texas than the mere possibility that someone in that jurisdiction might
have reached out to cyberspace to bring defamatory material to a screen in Texas." Id.
at *32.
211. See id. (stating that defamatory posting of information does not constitute real
and substantial connection to forum). The court stated "[t] he allegation of publication
fails as it rests on the mere transitory, passive presence in cyberspace of the alleged
defamatory material. Such a contact does not constitute a real and substantial pres-
ence." Id. at *33.
212. See id. at *36 (refusing to defer to comity and recognize judgment of Texas
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A. Texas District Court's Proceedings
On November 1, 1996, BrainTech, Inc.21 3 filed the original
petition2 1 4 against John C. Kostiuk2 1 5 in a Texas District Court,
alleging that Mr. Kostiuk posted defamatory information 2 16 on a
computer bulletin board.217  BrainTech did not serve Kostiuk,
but instead, they served the Secretary of State, who was under a
District Court). The court stated "[i]n the circumstances revealed by record before this
Court, British Columbia is the only natural forum and Texas is not an appropriate
forum." Id. Therefore, comity does not require the B.C. Court of Appeals to recognize
the judgment of the Texas Court. Id.
213. See BrainTech's Corporate Website (visited on Apr. 11, 2000) <http://www.
bnti.com/main/index.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(describing BrainTech as "[a] technology company founded in 1994, [that] specializes
in the design and development of adaptive pattern matching recognition technologies
and products."); BrainTech, 1999 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020 at *9 (describing company
as stated in original petition). The original petition stated:
BrainTech, Inc. is a developmental stage company with corporate offices lo-
cated in Vancouver, British Columbia and research and development facilities
located in Austin, Texas. BrainTech is involved in design and development of
advanced recognition systems based in its patented and highly adaptable set of
computer-based pattern matching algorithms.
Id.
214. See BrainTech, 1999 B.C.D. Civ.J. LEXIS 2020 at *13 (stating that on February
11, 1997, BrainTech filed amended petition in U.S. District Court of Harris County,
Texas).
215. See id. at *11 (describing Kostiuk as Canadian national with neither place of
business nor agent appointed for service in Texas).
216. See id. at *10 (stating that record was silent on allegedly defamatory state-
ments). The court stated "[t]here are no particulars in the record of either informa-
tion transmitted by Kostiuk or of his defences to the allegations of defamation and
business disparagement. It was assumed at trial and here that both are valid causes of
action sounding in torL" Id.
217. See id. at *9-10 (describing means of dissemination). Specifically, the means
of dissemination was alleged in BrainTech's amended pleading ("Amended Petition")
as follows:
A discussion group or bulletin board has been established on the Interet to
facilitate discussion and exchange of information regarding technology stocks
and investments. This discussion group, which is operated under the name
Silicon Investor, allows those interested in technology companies like
BrainTech to exchange information relevant to possible investments in such
companies.
Id.; Tracking High-Tech Stocks-Web Reviews, Yahoo! Internet Life, Aug. 1997 (visited
Feb. 27, 2000) <http://charts.techstocks.com/yahoo.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) (stating that Silicon Investor had "more than 60,000 active sub-
scribers-including many engineers, software developers, and even CEOs-posting
more than 1.3 million notes to their message boards to date, you will find no shortage
of expert analysis on hundreds of tech stocks, ranging from mighty Microsoft to tiny
Tekelec.")
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statutory duty to serve Kostiuk.211 Both the Secretary of State
and subsequently a local process server, however, were unable to
effectuate service.219 Notwithstanding the lack of actual service
of the complaint on Kostiuk, the District Court of Texas ac-
cepted that Kostiuk had notice of the litigation 220 and entered a
218. See TEXAs CML P.c'rrcE AND REMEDIES CODE §§17.044, 17.045 (prescribing
requirements for service on non-resident defendant). Section 17.044(b) states in rele-
vant part:
the Secretary of State is an agent for service of process on a nonresident who
engages in business in this state, but does not maintain a regular place of
business in this state or a designated agent for service of process, in any pro-
ceeding that arises out of the business done in this state and to which the
nonresident is a party.
Id. § 17.044(b). Section 17.045 (Notice to Nonresident) states in relevant part:
(a) If the Secretary of state is served with duplicate copies of process for a
nonresident, he shall require a statement of the name and address of the
nonresident's home or home office and shall immediately mail a copy of
the process to the nonresident.
(b)...
(c) ',..
(d) The process or notice must be sent by registered mail or by certified mail,
return receipt requested.
Id. § 17.045.
219. See BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 1999 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020 at *11-14 (describing
district court's inability to serve Mr. Kostiuk). The original complaint was sent to 2408
Westhill Court, West Vancouver, British Columbia, V7S 3A5. Id. at *12. Kostiuk, how-
ever, had not lived at this address for a period of nine months. Id. Instead, Kostiuk's
father, who accepted the letter, lived there. Id. The court summarized three affidavits
of Mr. Livington, the local process server:
(a) In his original affidavit of service (Livingston No. 1) asserts service of the
Amended Petition was effected by presenting and leaving the same with
John Kostiuk;
(b) says in Livingston No. 2 that service was effected upon 'a man who identi-
fied himself to me as the defendant'
(c) in Livingston No. 3, and with Kostiuk's denial of service before him, says
he recognized Kostiuk to whom he said "John"; the person who answered
the door did not deny this form of address; and, upon the person closing
the door as he attempted to effect service he thrust the Amended Petition
forward which jammed the door as it was closed.
Id. at *14.
220. See id. at *18 (stating that trial judge in Texas relied on affidavits of Mr. John
McDonald, Vice President at BrainTech). Mr. McDonald's affidavits stated:
a) by reason of prior contact with Kostiuk and his father in British Columbia,
that Kostiuk was known to evade service of process there;
b) his personal belief that Kostiuk acted in bad faith in defaming BrainTech
because of the part the latter's officials played in establishing that Kostiuk's
father had committed securities offenses;
c) BrainTech's general damages were $250,000 and $50,000 aggravated dam-
ages;
d) the correct address for Kostiuk remained at the Westhill Court address.
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default judgment.221 Two days later, BrainTech brought suit in
the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 222
B. Supreme Court of British Columbia
On August 8, 1997, Kostiuk filed his statement of defense in
the Supreme Court of British Columbia, denying service of pro-
cess, connection to the forum, and attornment to Texas. 223 Also,
Kostiuk alleged that the plaintiff defrauded the Texas District
Court.2 24 As relief, Kostiuk sought a declaration that the Texas
Court erred and a dismissal of BrainTech's claim. 25
BrainTech responded, claiming that jurisdiction was proper
under either Section 17.042(2) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code 226 or by reason of a real and substantial connec-
tion between the cause of action and Texas.22 17 Next, BrainTech
Id. at *17-18.
221. See id. at *3 (stating that Texas District Court awarded US$300,000, which is
equivalent to Can$409,680).
222. Id. at *2.
223. Id. at *34.
224. Id. at *3.
225. See id. at *4 (seeking "declaration that the Texas court acted without jurisdic-
tion and for an order dismissing BrainTech's claim.").
226. See TExAs CIVIL PRACrcE AND REMEDIES CODE §17.042 (proscribing require-
ments for jurisdiction in cases involving non-resident defendant). The Code provides:
In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident
defendant does business in this state if the nonresident:
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party
is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state;
(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or
(3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located
in this state, for employment inside or outside this state.
Id. § 17.042.
227. See BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 1999 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020 at *4-5 (listing particu-
lar basis upon which BrainTech claimed real and substantial connection between cause
of action and forum). The list includes:
(a) the Defendant defamed the Plaintiff and disparaged the business of the
Plaintiff by the transmission and publication in the State of Texas of un-
truths and false and disparaging words, as alleged in the Plaintiffs Origi-
nal Petition and First Amended Petition filed in the District Court of Har-
ris County.
(b) at the time of the aforesaid publication, shareholders of the Plaintiff re-
sided in ... Texas
(c) at the time of the aforesaid publication, the Plaintiff maintained an office
in Texas, its director of research and development resided in Texas and its
research and development activities were carried on in Texas. Further-
more, the Plaintiffs head office had been located in Texas until 1995;
(d) ...
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filed a notice of motion for judgment under Rule 18A of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 28 In response,
Kostiuk moved for an order adjourning the summary trial appli-
cation, seeking more time to conduct discovery. 229 The court
denied Kostiuk's motion,23 ° but allowed the hearing for the
Rule 18A application to proceed. l On April 2, 1998, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled in favor of BrainTech,
enforcing the judgment of the Texas District Court.232
C. British Columbia Court of Appeals
On appeal, the B.C. Court of Appeals addressed three is-
sues. 233 The B.C. Court of Appeals, however, stated that any
(e) it was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants that the Plaintiff's reputa-
tion stood to be injured in Texas by the publication of untruths by the
Defendant in Texas;
Id.
228. See id. at *6 (citing Rule 18A of Supreme Court of British Columbia, which
state options of court upon hearing Rule 18A motion). Sub-rule 11 (a) states that upon
hearing the motion, a court may:
(a) grant judgment in favor of any party, either on an issue or generally, un-
less
(i) the court is unable, on the whole of the evidence before the court on
the application, to find the facts necessary to decide the issues of fact
or law, or
(ii) the court is of the opinion that it would be unjust to decide the issues
on the application.
Id.
229. See id at *5 (stating that Kostiuk wanted to continue discovery in order to
cross-examine key individuals).
230. See id. at *6 (presenting B.C. Court of Appeals' opinion that further discovery
was clearly warranted). The B.C. Court of Appeals stated, however, that the decision to
proceed to summary trial does not amount to a failure ofjudicial discretion. Id. at *7.
231. Id. at *7.
232. See BrainTech, Inc. v. Kostiuk, [1990] 88 A.C.W.S. 3d 565, *7-8 (Can.) (find-
ing real and substantial connection since BrainTech maintained research and develop-
ment, marketing, and investor relations office in Texas). Also, 10% of BrainTech's
shareholders, and BrainTech's chief technology officer, lived in Texas. Id. Due to the
location of BrainTech's shareholders, offices, and management in the forum state, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia stated that damages incurred in Texas by means of
Internet publication in the forum state. Id. at 8; see also BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 1999
B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020 at *22 (noting that enforcement required Supreme Court of
British Columbia to apply Morguard test and find real and substantial connection ex-
isted between cause of action and forum state). Also, the trial judge dismissed Kostiuk's
claim on insufficient service of process, finding that the Texas court relied on service
through the Secretary of State. Id. at *16.
233. See BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 1999 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 2020 at *3 (listing three
issues that Court of Appeals recognized on Kostiuk's appeal). The court stated that the
issues were:
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fraud practiced on the Texas court,23 4 or any error on the Rule
18A proceeding did not effect the final determination. 235 Ulti-
mately, the B.C. Court of Appeals stated that the crux of the ap-
peal was whether the Texas Court had a real and substantial con-
nection with the cause of action.23 6
The B.C. Court of Appeals recognized that comity was an
element in the case at bar, necessitating an Amchem analysis.237
The court stated, however, that the Texas District Court was
bound by principles similar to the Canadian doctrine of forum
non conveniens.238 This analysis left one issue, whether a real and
substantial connection existed between Texas and the cause of
action.23 9
1. Whether, in the circumstances, the trial judge erred in proceeding to sum-
mary trial under the provisions of Rule 18A of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia[?] [sic]
2. Whether a fraud was practiced on the Texas court of which cognizance
should be taken in the courts of British Columbia[?] [sic]
3. Whether there was a real and substantial connection between Texas and
the wrongdoing alleged to have taken place in that state[?] [sic]
Id.
234. Id. at *18 (listing court's reasons for such decision). The Court of Appeals
stated "[w]hether a fraud was or was not committed on the Texas Court has, at this
stage and in these proceedings, little relevance if there is not established a real and
substantial connection between the Texas court and the parties to this litigation." Id.
235. See id. at *6-7 (stating that court did not need to decide this issue). The Court
of Appeals stated:
[T] he decision whether to proceed to trial on the affidavit material is a matter
within the discretion of the trial judge. The motion to adjourn was not made
in a timely way. In my view it has not been demonstrated that his decision to
proceed with the summary trial amounts to a failure to exercise a discretionary
power judicially. I would not give effect to the appellant's contention in this
Court that the cause should be remitted to the Supreme Court to be placed on
the regular trial list.
Id.
236. See id. at *18 (stating that appeal must "succeed on the issue of whether the
Texas court had a real and substantial connection with the subject matter of the ac-
tion.").
237. See id. at *22-23 (stating that decision in Amchem was not considered by trial
judge).
238. See id. at *24 (noting that Amchem specifically dealt with enforcement ofjudg-
ment rendered in Texas).
239. See id. at *26-27 (commenting that court could not apply Morguard real and
substantial test without defining real and substantial connection in context of Internet
communications). The court specifically stated:
If the obligation to defer to the comity which is to be accorded the default
judgment of the District Court of Harris County pronounced 7 May 1997 is to
be tested by the principle of forum non conveniens some flesh must be put on
the bare bones of "real and substantial connection."
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In order to determine whether a real and substantial con-
nection existed, the B.C. Court of Appeals applied the Zippo test
that bases jurisdiction on a sliding commercial scale. 240 Finding
that the bulletin board on which Kostiuk posted information was
passive, the B.C. Court of Appeals held that the Texas Court
could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction.241 Therefore,
the B.C. Court of Appeals did not enforce the judgment.2 42
The B.C. Court of Appeals further stated that the mere post-
ing of information was insufficient to find jurisdiction, noting
that better proof was necessary than evidence of a website's ac-
cessibility in a foreign jurisdiction. 24 Although the B.C. Court
of Appeals did not explicitly state what constituted better proof,
the court listed eight reasons why the Texas court was an inap-
propriate forum.244 The list, however, is inclusive, according to
Id.
240. See id. at *28-31 (quoting at length from Zippo decision). Specifically, the B.C.
Court of Appeals quoted the Zippo court's description of Internet and also the Zippo
court's jurisdiction analysis. Id.
241. Id. at *32 (stating that no evidence existed to indicate that Kostiuk's speech
had commercial purpose).
242. See id. at *36 (allowing appeal, setting aside judgment, and dismissing action).
243. See id. at *32 (refusing to adopt specific standard that would subject defend-
ant to suit in any jurisdiction). The court continued to state:
It would create a crippling effect on freedom of expression if, in everyjurisdic-
tion the world over in which access to Internet could be achieved, a person
who posts fair comment on a bulletin board could be haled before the courts
of each of those countries where access to this bulletin board could be ob-
tained.
Id.
244. See id. at *33-35 (providing court's factual basis for declining to enforce Texas
District Court judgment). The court specifically stated:
1. Kostiuk is a non-resident of Texas who has neither done business nor
maintained a place of business nor appointed an agent for service there.
His only connection is "deemed" by virtue of the allegation of having com-
mitted a tort in Texas.
2. BrainTech is a Nevada corporation domiciled in British Columbia. Ac-
cording to the Standard & Poor's [sic] service excerpt to Kostiuk's affida-
vit of 18 February 1998, it was incorporated in Nevada on 4 March 1987
and has undergone a number of name changes before assuming its pres-
ent name in 1987. As of December 1996 its transfer agent was located in
Salt Lake City; its office in North Vancouver, British Columbia its stock was
traded on the OTC Bulletin Board (the location of which is not identi-
fied); and its principal officers (Chairman, President and Vice President
and Chief Financial Officers) were located in North or West Vancouver.
3. BrainTech has had no presence in Texas since 31 December 1996. Be-
tween 1 September and 31 December 1996 its technical development ac-
tivities are said to have been centered in Austin, Texas. Between January
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the B.C. Court of Appeals.245
III. THE B.C. COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE ZIPPO
TEST AND FAILED TO FOLLOW THE SPIRIT OF MORGUARD
AND ITS PROGENY
The B.C. Court of Appeals' decision in BrainTech v. Kos-
tiuk24 6 demonstrates the ability of individuals to use the network-
structure of the Internet 247 and the technical-capabilities of bul-
letin boards24 8 as a shield from the application of a sovereign's
laws. 249 By refusing to recognize and enforce the ruling of the
Texas District Court, the B.C. Court of Appeals established a pre-
cedent that allows residents to post defamatory comments on a
computer bulletin board intentionally.2 "0 The defamatory post-
1994 and the fall of 1995 its head office was located in Arizona. In the fall
of 1995 it was moved to Vancouver.
4. No person in Texas is alleged to have seen the alleged defamatory mate-
rial and the witnesses required to prove its damages are acknowledged to
be citizens of Canada. The only proof of damages in the record is the
McDonald affidavit of 17 April 1997, sworn in Vancouver.
5. Nojuridical advantage is alleged to accrue in Texas which is not available
if a defamation action was brought in British Columbia.
The authorities cited in BrainTech's brief in support of default judgment
relate to the use within Texas of electronic communication for actual busi-
ness purposes. None support the passive posting on an electronic bulletin
board as constituting in itself the commission of a tort within Texas.
To enforce recovery of the default judgment obtained in Texas on the
deemed proof of use of an electronic bulletin board would encourage a
multiplicity of actions the world over where the Internet was available.
6. The mode of service in the case at bar falls below the minimum constitu-
tional standards for an American court.
Id.
245. See id. at *33 (stating that list of reasons considered by B.C. Court of Appeals
was not exhaustive).
246. See supra notes 233-45 and accompanying text (discussing BrainTech v. Kos-
tiuk).
247. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (noting that Internet is com-
puter network that functions by continuously communicating).
248. See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text (discussing use of Internet bul-
letin boards and advantages to bulletin board over traditional forms of communica-
tion).
249. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (noting ability of individual to
commit Cybertort and effectively evade application of territorial laws); see also supra
notes 156-59 and accompanying text (stating that Internet communication quickly tran-
scends territorial laws).
250. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (holding that posting defama-
tory comment, without more, does not constitute real and substantial connection to
forum state).
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ings are still actionable in British Columbia, but the capabilities
of the Internet allow individuals to inflict injury throughout the
world.25' If such an injury occurs, then economic considerations
may prohibit the injured party from bringing suit, preventing
the administration of justice and the compensation of the ag-
grieved party.
Although the B.C. Court of Appeals applied the proper
framework to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment,2 52 the
BrainTech court did not comply with the spirit of the doctrine, as
espoused in Amchem.2 53 Also, the B.C. Court of Appeals improp-
erly applied existing U.S. precedents to determine whether a
real and substantial connection existed. Instead of applying the
Zippo test,254 the B.C. Court of Appeals should have applied the
Calder effects test,2 55 finding that a real and substantial connec-
tion existed between the cause of action and the forum state.
A. The B.C. Court of Appeals Failed To Follow the Spirit of the
Canadian Doctrine of Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments
With the decision in Amchem, the Supreme Court of Canada
stated that the Canadian doctrine of recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments would no longer protect Canada's
sovereignty.2 56 Instead, the Canadian doctrine would reflect the
changes wrought by globalization2 7 and recognize a foreign
judgment if a real and substantial connection exists between the
251. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (noting that Internet allows
individuals to communicate with global audience).
252. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text (applying Canadian doctrine of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment to Cybertort).
253. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text (noting that Canadian doctrine
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments evolved from protectionist norms
to doctrine that balances international duty with territorial sovereignty).
254. See supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text (stating that courts apply Zippo
test to determine constitutionality of court's exercise of jurisdiction).
255. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text (discussing application of
traditional media cases to Cybertorts).
256. See supra notes 81-100 and accompanying text (noting that Canadian courts
will defer to comity and recognize and enforce judgment if foreign court has not de-
parted from Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens).
257. See Morguard Investments, Ltd. v. De. Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1097
(Can.) (discussing prevalence of international business and decentralization of legal
and political power and noting that facilitation of "flow of wealth, skills and people
across state lines has now become imperative.").
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forum state and the cause of action. 258 This indicated a sharp
departure from the doctrinal formulation that existed, but a de-
parture that reflected the reality of progress. 25
9
The Amchem court did not specifically address the Internet.
Amchem, however, should be applied to foreign Cybertortjudg-
ments,2 60 since the case arose in response to globalization, a pro-
cess clearly facilitated by the Internet. 61 Therefore, Canadian
courts should implement the Amchem court's ideal of increased
recognition of foreign judgments and refrain from adopting an
isolationist stance when litigation involves a Cybertort.
The BrainTech court applied the analytical framework es-
poused in Morguard and Amchem, but failed to comply with this
ideal of increased recognition. 26 2 The B.C. Court of Appeals did
not encourage recognition of foreign judgments, but instead,
adopted a protectionist attitude, fearing that enforcement would
lead to lawsuits against Canadian nationals across the globe.263
Also, the holding in BrainTech allows an individual to hide be-
hind territorial boundaries,264 a result that not only violates the
spirit of Amchem Court, but also that language of the Amchem
Court.
2 6 5
258. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing Canadian doctrine of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
259. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (following evolution of Cana-
dian doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments from protectionist
pre-revolutionary French civil law and British common law rules to doctrine based on
human interaction in modern society).
260. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (noting that Internet facilitates
globalization); see also supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (discussing ability of
Internet discussions to occur with individuals from different countries across globe).
261. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (commenting that Internet is
form of modern communication technology that facilitates globalization by disseminat-
ing material throughout world).
262. See supra notes 233-45 and accompanying text (refusing to recognize judg-
ment of Texas District Court because bulletin board posting did not constitute real and
substantial connection between cause of action and forum state).
263. See sup'ra note 243 and accompanying text (stating that exercise ofjurisdiction
would have detrimental effect on freedom of expression).
264. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing ability of individuals
to use territorial boundaries and network capabilities of Internet as shield to commit
Cybertorts with anonymity).
265. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 932 (Can.) (stating that "since the court is concerned with
the ends ofjustice... account must be taken not only of injustice to the defendant if
the plaintiff is allowed to pursue the foreign proceedings, but also of injustice to the
plaintiff if he is not allowed to do so.") (internal citations omitted).
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B. The B.C. Court of Appeals Improperly Applied the Zippo Test To
Determine Whether a Real and Substantial Connection Existed
Between the Cause of Action and the Forum State
The Canadian doctrine of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments compels Canadian courts to recognize a for-
eign judgment if a real and substantial connection exists be-
tween the cause of action and the forum state.266 The ability of
the Internet to transcend territorial borders, however, compli-
cates this determination. 267 Therefore, courts and scholars have
presented numerous solutions to facilitate the jurisdictional
analysis when a Cybertort occurs.2 8
In BrainTech v. Kostiuk, the B.C. Court of Appeals applied
one solution, the Zippo test,269 to determine whether the exercise
ofjurisdiction by the District Court of Texas was proper.2 70 Find-
ing that John Kostiuk's postings did not have a commercial pur-
pose,271 the B.C. Court of Appeals stated that a real and substan-
tial connection did not exist between the cause of action and the
forum state.272 By applying the Zippo test to a defamatory bulle-
tin board posting, however, the B.C. Court of Appeals misap-
plied U.S. case law273 and failed to heed the advice of scholars.274
Although U.S. courts apply multiple theories to determine
whether jurisdiction over a Cybertorts is proper, recent decisions
266. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text (formulating Canadian doc-
trine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
267. See supra notes 156-71 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional
problems created by Cybertorts and scholars' responses).
268. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text (discussing three general ap-
proaches to base jurisdiction in cases involving Internet).
269. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text (describing Zippo test that bases
constitutionality of court to exercise jurisdiction on level of commercial interactivity of
website).
270. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text (refusing to find real and sub-
stantial connection between forum and cause of action because statements ofJohn Kos-
tiuk did not have commercial content and, therefore, exercise of jurisdiction is uncon-
stitutional).
271. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing commercial nature of
John Kostiuk's speech).
272. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text (applying Zippo test and con-
cluding that Texas District Court could not have exercised jurisdiction constitution-
ally).
273. See supra notes 180-208 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Cybertort
case law and noting that existing case law specifically addresses defamatory claims on
Internet).
274. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (noting shortcomings of Zippo).
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indicate that a consensus is emerging. 275 U.S. courts follow pri-
marily two approaches: the Zippo test and the Calder test.2 76
Zippo applies when the Cybertort clearly involves commercial ac-
tivity,277 while Calder applies when the Cybertort involves defama-
2781tory postings.
The cursory analysis of Zippo by the B.C. Court of Appeals
indicates that the court did not fully comprehend Zippo and its
progeny. Zippo applies when a nonresident defendant enters
contracts279 or commercial transactions on-line. 28 0  Also, U.S.
courts apply the Zippo test when the non-resident defendant
owns or operates a website.281 In BrainTech, however, John Kos-
tiuk did not own or operate a website, or enter into contracts on-
line. Instead, John Kostiuk posted allegedly defamatory informa-
tion on a bulletin board, an act devoid of any commercial intent.
The B.C. Court of Appeals should have applied the Calder
effects test to determine whether there was a real and substantial
connection between the cause of action and the forum state.
The Calder effects test acknowledges the similarities between
traditional and on-line communication methods.28 2 Also, the
Calder effects test allows courts to compensate victims of harmful,
on-line contacts, even if the contact does not occur in a commer-
cial context.283 If the B.C. Court of Appeals applied Calder in
BrainTech v. Kostiuk, then the holding would have differed be-
275. See supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text (discussing two main cases,
Zippo and Calder, that U.S. courts apply to analyze propriety of exercising jurisdiction).
276. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (discussing Cybertorts and
application of Calder, which analyzes effect of posting to determine whether jurisdiction
is proper).
277. See supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
Zippo to variety of commercial Internet contacts).
278. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
Calder to Cybertorts and noting variety of factors courts apply in analysis).
279. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing application of Zippo
when parties entered into contractual agreements online).
280. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
Zippo to owners and operators of web sites).
281. See id. (discussing U.S. case law analyzing on-line commercial activity). In all
of the cases, the non-resident defendant owned or operated a website, which the plain-
tiff claimed was sufficient grounds to establish jurisdiction. Id.
282. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (noting that traditional forms
of publication and Internet communication both allow individuals to cause harm across
national borders).
283. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of Zippo
and noting that Zippo test does not compensate victims harmed in non-commercial con-
text).
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cause BrainTech maintained offices in the forum state,284 the de-
famatory comments were published in the forum state,28 5 and
the effect of the defamatory comments were felt in the forum
state. 28
6
CONCLUSION
Due to the technical capabilities of the Internet, individuals
are increasingly interacting on-line with an international audi-
ence. This interaction will inevitably lead to litigation, and when
it does, courts will be forced to decide novel questions of law.
One such question, the circumstances under which a court will
recognize and enforce a foreign Cybertort judgment, was ad-
dressed for the first time in Canada by the British Columbia
Court of Appeals in BrainTech v. Kostiuk. The B.C. Court of Ap-
peals refused to enforce the judgment of the Texas district
court, holding that a defamatory bulletin-board posting did not
constitute a real and substantial connection between the forum
state and the cause of action. The decision established a danger-
ous precedent, allowing Canadian citizens to use territorial
boundaries as a shield from the reach of another country's laws.
Also, the decision indicates that Canada will not cooperate with
foreign countries to monitor and regulate Internet conduct,
choosing instead to litigate Internet claims within the Canadian
court system. Such a protectionist stance, however, will hinder
the worldwide administration ofjustice by allowing individuals to
exploit the limited reach of courts' adjudicatory jurisdictions.
Therefore, other courts within Canada, and around the world,
should resist establishing isolationist precedents, and instead,
should adopt cooperative mechanisms to recognize and enforce
foreign, Cybertort judgments when the Internet activity is clearly
commercial or directly effects an individual within the forum
state.
284. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (noting that BrainTech maintained
numerous offices in forum state, conducting research and development, marketing,
and investor relations activities).
285. See id. (holding that real and substantial connection existed between cause of
action and forum state because defamatory bulletin board postings were published in
forum state).
286. See id. and accompanying text (noting that 10% of BrainTech's shareholders
reside in forum state and finding that BrainTech suffered damages in forum state).
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